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LIMITATIONS ON STATE AGENCY AUTHORITY TO ADOPT
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS MORE STRINGENT
THAN FEDERAL STANDARDS: POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS AND
INTERPRETIVE PROBLEMS
JEROME M. ORGAN*
In the early 1970s, in response to the states' inability to address
adequately the degradation of environmental resources in the face of
ever-expanding industrialization and urbanization, Congress con-
cluded that a national system of environmental regulation was neces-
sary to improve the environment and avoid "environmental
balkanization."' Accordingly, Congress enacted, among other stat-
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1. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86YALE L.J. 1196, 1211-12 (1977). Stewart
noted that "[t]he characteristic insistence in federal environmental legislation upon geo-
graphically uniform standards and controls strongly suggests that escape from the Tragedy
of the Commons by reduction of transaction costs has been an important reason" for fed-
eral environmental legislation. Id. at 1212 (referring to Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SciEr'cE 1243 (1968)). In debating amendments to the Clean Air Act in
1970 and 1977, Congress expressed its concern that interstate competition for industry
would lead to lower environmental standards. The legislative history of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970 contained the following language regarding the need for New
Source Performance Standards: "'The promulgation of Federal emission standards for
new sources.., will preclude efforts on the part of States to compete with each other.., to
attract new plants and facilities without assuring adequate control of... emissions there-
from.'" Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bot-
tom" Rationak for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv., 1210, 1227 (1992)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CAN.
5356, 5358). The legislative history of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 contained
the following language regarding the need for a prevention of significant deterioration
program:
Without national guidelines for the prevention of significant deterioration a State
deciding to protect its clean air resources will . . .become the target of "eco-
nomic-environmental blackmail" from new industrial plants that will play one
State off against another with threats to locate in whichever State adopts the most
permissive pollution controls.
Revesz, supra, at 1227 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 134 (1977), re-
printed in 1977 U.S.C.CAN. 1077, 1213).
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utes, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 19702 [hereinafter Clean Air
Act] and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
19723 [hereinafter Clean Water Act]. These statutes required the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish national ambient
air quality standards [hereinafter NAAQS] and national emission and
effluent standards to regulate how much pollution certain categories
of sources could discharge into the air or water.4 At the same time,
however, Congress showed a desire to promote federalism and experi-
mentation in environmental regulation by giving the states the re-
sponsibility to develop implementation plans to assure compliance
with the NAAQS,5 the opportunity to administer the federal pro-
grams,6 and the freedom to impose standards more stringent than
those imposed by the Clean Air Act 7 and Clean Water Act.'
In many of the other environmental statutes Congress has en-
acted since the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, Congress similarly
has given the states the right to administer the regulatory program
2. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7 4 01- 7 6 7lq (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
4. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, § 4(a), 84 Stat. at 1679 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (requiring EPA to promulgate National Ambient Air Quality
Standards); id. § 4(a), 84 Stat. at 1683 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7411) (requir-
ing EPA to promulgate New Source Performance Standards); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 2, 86 Stat. at 854 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1316) (re-
quiring EPA to promulgate New Source Performance Standards).
5. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, § 4(a), 84 Stat. at 1680 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 7410) (describing state implementation plan process).
6. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, § 4(a), 84 Stat. at 1687 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 7414(b) (authorizing delegation of enforcement responsibility under the
Clean Air Act to the states); Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, § 2, 86
Stat. at 858 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1318(c)) (authorizing delegation of en-
forcement responsibility under the Clean Water Act to the states).
7. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, § 4(a), (c), 84 Stat. at 1678, 1689 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7416) (providing that, except for preemption of certain state regu-
lation of moving sources, "nothing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any
State or any political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation
respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or abate-
ment of air pollution," and further providing that no state or political subdivision may
adopt or enforce any emission standard or limitation less stringent than a standard or
limitation in effect under an applicable State Implementation Plan or under §§ 7411 or
7412 of the Clean Air Act); see Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 260-65 (1976) (recog-
nizing that states may adopt a State Implementation Plan that results in more stringent
emission standards than the Clean Air Act).
8. Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, § 2, 86 Stat. at 893 (1972)
(codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1370) (similarly authorizing states to adopt or enforce standards or
limitations that are more, but not less, stringent than any effluent limitation, effluent stan-
dard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance in effect under the
Clean Water Act).
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and/or the authority to impose standards more stringent than the fed-
eral environmental statute required. 9 Although many states have ac-
cepted the responsibility to administer the federal environmental
programs,1 ° some state legislatures, through their environmental leg-
islation, have shown an increasing tendency to constrain state environ-
mental agencies from promulgating standards more stringent than
federal standards."'
This Article addresses policy questions and interpretive difficul-
ties presented by these state legislative constraints on the authority of
state environmental agencies. Part I summarizes the different ap-
proaches state legislatures have taken to constrain state environmental
agencies from promulgating standards more stringent than federal
environmental law. Part II discusses possible reasons for, and policy
implications of, these ever-increasing state legislative constraints on
the authority of state environmental agencies. Part III analyzes the
extent to which the different statutory approaches to constraining the
authority of state environmental agencies present three different stat-
utory interpretation problems. Acknowledging that state legislatures
may continue to find good reasons for constraining the authority of
state environmental agencies to promulgate standards more stringent
than federal environmental law, the Article concludes in Part IV with
proposed model language for state legislatures to use. This language
9. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), Pub. L. No. 94-
580, § 2, 90 Stat. 2795, 2809 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1988) (pro-
viding mechanism for states to administer and enforce their own hazardous waste pro-
grams); id. § 2, 90 Stat. at 2812 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6929) (providing that
"[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit any State or political subdivision
thereof from imposing any requirements.... which are more stringent than those imposed
by such regulations"); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA),
Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 503, 91 Stat. 447, 470 (1977) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (1988)
(providing mechanism for states to obtain "exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of
surface coal mining and reclamation operations"); id. § 505, 91 Star. at 473 (codified at 30
U.S.C. § 1255) (providing that any state law or regulation more stringent than a similar
provision in SMCRA, or addressing an aspect of surface mining and reclamation opera-
tions for which SMCRA contains no provision, shall not be construed as inconsistent with
SMCRA); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 114, 94 Stat. 2767, 2795 (1980) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1988)) (providing that nothing in CERCLA shall be con-
strued to preempt "any State from imposing any additional liability or requirements with
respect to the release of hazardous substances within such State").
10. Over 40 states have received authorization to administer portions of the Clean Air
Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Resource Conservation Recovery Act. States that receive
authorization essentially agree to incur the additional costs associated with administering
these federal regulatory programs. States are willing to incur these costs because they per-
ceive a benefit in having primary enforcement authority with respect to regulated entities
within the state, rather than leaving primary enforcement authority with EPA.
11. See infra Part I (discussing statutory restrictions on state agency authority).
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will minimize the extent to which state statutory constraints on the
authority of state environmental agencies create ambiguity and gener-
ate disputes over the scope of the agencies' authority.
I. SUMMARY OF STATE LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS LIMITING THE
AUTHORITY OF STATE AGENCIES TO PROMULGATE
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
The mid-1970s saw the earliest state legislation constraining the
authority of state agencies to promulgate environmental regulations
more stringent than federal environmental law.12 During the last dec-
ade, however, an increasing number of states have enacted legislation
that constrains, at least to some degree, the authority of state agencies
to promulgate environmental regulations more stringent than federal
environmental statutes."3 In general, the statutes fall into one of two
12. Florida enacted the first statutory constraint on state agency authority in 1975.
1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-22, § 6 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.804 (West
1993)). Iowa enacted a statutory constraint relating to water quality in 1976. 1976 Iowa
Acts (66 GA) ch. 1204, §§ 6-8, 23 (codified at IowA CODE § 455B.173(2) (1993)). Mis-
souri enacted a statutory constraint on the authority of the Air Conservation Commission
in 1979. 1979 Mo. Laws S.B. 21 (codified as amended at Mo. REV. STAT. § 643.055(1)
(1993)).
13. Since 1987, 19 states have enacted at least one statute constraining the authority of
a state agency to promulgate rules more stringent than required by federal environmental
law. See 1988 Ala. Acts 88-378, § 10 (codified at ALA. CODE § 22-35-10 (1993)) (concerning
underground storage tanks); 1990 Alaska Sess. Laws 96, § 2 (codified at ALASKA STAr.
§ 46.03.365(c) (1993)) (same); 1989 Ariz. Sess. Laws 201, §§ 4, 7, 9 (codified at ARiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 49-1003(C), -1006(B), -1009(C) (1993)) (same); 1989 Ark. Acts 172, § 3
(codified at ARI. CODE ANN. § 8-7-803 (Michie 1993)) (same); 1992 Colo. Sess. Laws 92-
105, § 18 (codified at COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 25-7-114.2 (West 1994)) (concerning indi-
rect air pollution sources); 1989 Colo. Sess. Laws 181, § 2 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 25-8-202(8)(a) (West 1994)) (concerning water quality control); 1985 Iowa Acts
162, § 4 (codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.474.7 (West 1993) (concerning underground
storage tanks); 1989 Nev. Stat. 371, § 13 (codified at NEV. REv. STAT. § 459.824 (1991))
(same); 1989 N.H. Laws 249:17 (codified at N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 146-C:9 (1993))
(same); 1989 N.D. Laws 299, § 1 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-04.1 (1993) (ad-
dressing all areas of environmental regulation); 1993 Ohio Laws File 62, § 1 (S.B. 153)
(codified at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3704.036 (Anderson 1994)) (relating to the Title V
permit program under the Clean Air Act); 1994 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 96 (H.B. 1919)
(West) (codified at OuA.& STAT. tit. 27A, § 1-1-206 (1994)) (relating to economic impact
analysis for any environmental rules "more stringent than corresponding federal require-
ments"); 1989 Okla. Sess. Laws 90, §§ 7-8 (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 17, §§ 307-308
(1993)) (concerning underground storage tanks); 1992 Okla. Sess. Laws 215, § 14 (codi-
fied at OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1815(A)(1)-(2) (1993)) (concerning hazardous air pollu-
tants); 1991 Or. Laws 863, § 14 (codified at OR. Rzv. STAT. § 466.746(1)(e), (2)(b) (1993))
(concerning underground storage tanks); 1992 Pa. Laws 460, § 9 (codified at 35 PA. CoNs.
STAT. ANN. § 4006.6 (1993)) (concerning hazardous air pollutants); 1992 S.D. Laws 254,
§ 100 (codified at S.D. CODIFIED Laws ANN. § 1-40-4.1 (1993)) (addressing all areas of envi-
ronmental regulation); 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 878 (S.B. 2040) (codified at TENN. CODE
ANN. § 4-5-225 (1994)) (relating to the invalidation of environmental requirements "on
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classifications: (1) statutes imposing an unconditional restriction on
state agency authority;14 and (2) statutes imposing a conditional re-
striction on state agency authority.' 5 Although most of the statutes
are media-specific or source-specific statutes,' 6 several states recently
have enacted statutes that generally constrain the state environmental
agency from promulgating any regulation more stringent than federal
environmental laws or regulations.
1 7
A. Statutes Imposing an Unconditional Restriction on State Agency
Authority
Statutes imposing unconditional restrictions on state agency au-
thority generally contain some language, the exact phrasing of which
varies from state to state, expressly prohibiting an agency from
promulgating any standards or regulations more stringent than fed-
eral laws and regulations. These statutes may be either media-specific
or source-specific, or they may impose significantly broader
constraints.
1. Media-Specific and Source-Specific Statutes Containing Uncondi-
tional Restrictions.-
a. Air Pollution.-An example of a media-specific statute is
New Mexico's statute that generally constrains its environmental
agency from promulgating air pollution regulations more stringent
than the Clean Air Act. This statute authorizes the adoption of air
pollution regulations, provided that the regulations
(a) shall be no more stringent than but at least as stringent
as required by the federal act and federal regulations per-
municipalities or counties that are more stringent than federal statutes or rules"); 1987
Tex. Gen. Laws 277, § 1 (codified at TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.357(b) (West 1988))
(concerning underground storage tanks); 1987 Utah Laws 12, §§ 4, 6 (codified at UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 19-2-106, 19-5-105 (1991) (concerning air and water quality control); 1994
W. Va. Acts 61 (codified at W. VA. CODE § 22-1-3a (1994) (concerning environmental provi-
sions generally) and § 22-17-6 (1994) (concerning underground storage tanks)); 1990
Wyo. Sess. Laws 88, § 1 (codified at Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-1416(a)(i) (1993)) (concerning
underground storage tanks).
Because this Article focuses generally on state agency authority to regulate air pollu-
tion, water pollution and underground storage tanks, it does not purport to set forth an
exhaustive listing of all state statutes which impose some type of constraint on the authority
of state agencies to promulgate environmental regulations more stringent than federal
environmental laws.
14. See infra Part I.A.
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. See infra notes 18-27, 33-59 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 28-32, 60-66 and accompanying text.
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taining to visibility protection in mandatory class 1 areas, per-
taining to prevention of significant deterioration and
pertaining to nonattainment areas; and (b) shall be applica-
ble only to sources subject to such regulation pursuant to the
federal act."8
The New Mexico statute further authorizes the promulgation of stan-
dards of performance for sources and emission standards for hazard-
ous air pollutants, provided that the standards "(a) shall be no more
stringent than but at least as stringent as required by federal standards
of performance; and (b) shall be applicable only to sources subject to
such federal standards of performance."1 9
Colorado also has a statute constraining state agency regulation
of air pollution, although it applies only to regulation of indirect air
pollution sources.2" The statute provides that regulations relating to
indirect air pollution sources "shall not be more stringent than those
required for compliance with the federal act and final rules and regu-
lations adopted pursuant thereto."21 Similarly, Ohio recently enacted
a statute limiting the authority of its state agencies to promulgate reg-
ulations more stringent than federal laws or regulations. Ohio's stat-
ute authorizes the promulgation of rules for purposes of
implementing the Title V permit program under the Clean Air Act,
provided the rules "are consistent with, and no more stringent than,
the requirements of Title V of the federal Clean Air Act and 40 C.F.R.
part 70."22
b. Underground Storage Tanks.-Examples of source-specific
constraints exist in several states which recently have enacted uncondi-
tional constraints on the authority of state agencies to promulgate
standards more stringent than federal regulations in the context of
underground storage tanks. For example, one Alaska statute provides
that if state underground storage tank regulations "address areas gov-
erned by federal laws or regulations, the state regulations must be
consistent with federal laws and regulations and may not be more
stringent than the federal laws and regulations."2 3 Arizona likewise
18. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-5C(1)(a), (b) (Michie 1993).
19. Id. §§ 74-2-5C(2) (a), (2) (b), (3). The statute makes one exception, providing that
regulations governing emissions from solid waste incinerators may be more stringent than
federal emission limitations. Id.
20. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-7-114.23 (West 1993).
21. Id.
22. 1993 Ohio Laws File 62, § 1 (S.B. 153) (codified at OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3704.036 (Anderson 1994)).
23. AiLAsKA STAT. § 46.03.365(c) (1993). Section 46.03.420(c) (2) (A) is the only excep-
tion to the requirement that state regulations for underground storage tanks be no more
1378 [VOL. 54:1373
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has a statute providing that underground storage tank rules "shall be
consistent with and no more stringent than the federal regulations in
effect on the date on which the rules are adopted."24 New Mexico
also has a statute providing for "regulations concerning underground
storage tanks that are equivalent to, and no more stringent than, fed-
eral regulations adopted by the federal environmental protection
agency pursuant to the federal Resource Conservation Recovery Act of
1976, as amended."2 5 Several other state statutes concerning under-
ground storage tanks have similar language prohibiting promulgation
of regulations more stringent than federal law.
2 6
c. Water Pollution.-A Virginia water pollution control stat-
ute prevents the pollution control board from requiring "the Com-
monwealth, or any political subdivision thereof, to upgrade the level
of treatment in any works to a level more stringent than that required
by applicable provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as
amended. 27
stringent than federal law. It allows the state agency to require the upgrading of under-
ground storage tanks before federal law so requires. Id.
24. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-1003, -1006, -1009 (1993).
25. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-4-4C (Michie 1993).
26. ALA. CODE § 22-35-10 (1993) (providing that rules and regulations pertaining to
underground storage tanks shall not be "more stringent than those provided by federal
rules or regulations"); AR. CODE ANN. § 8-7-803 (Michie 1993) (providing that any regula-
tions relating to underground storage tanks "shall as much as possible be identical to and
no more stringent than the federal regulations adopted by the United States Environmen-
tal Protection Agency"); IOWA CODE §§ 455B.474(1)(g), (3)(d), 7 (1993) (providing that
rules adopted shall be "consistent with" and "shall not exceed" the requirements of federal
regulations once federal regulations are adopted); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 459.824 (Michie
1993) (providing for administration of the provisions relating to storage tanks "in a man-
ner that is consistent with, and not more stringent than, the applicable provisions of fed-
eral law"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 249:17 (1993) (providing that rules relating to financial
responsibility for underground storage tanks adopted pursuant to § 149-C:9 "shall not be
more stringent than the federal rules"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-20.3-04.1 (1993) (providing
that regulations relating to underground storage tanks "may not be more stringent than
applicable federal rules" adopted pursuant to RCRA); OKLA. STAT. tit. 17, § 308(H) (1993)
(providing that regulations regarding financial responsibility coverage with respect to un-
derground storage tanks "shall not be more stringent than is required by the federal Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency for underground storage tank systems of equal type, age,
and classification"); W. VA. CODE § 22-17-6 (1994) (providing that rules relating to under-
ground storage tanks "shall be no more stringent than the rules and regulations promul-
gated by the United States environmental protection agency pursuant to Subtitle I"); Wvo.
STAT. § 35-11-1416 (1993) (requiring that rules and regulations shall " [p] rovide for per-
formance, operating and installation standards for underground storage tanks which shall
be no less or no more stringent than the federal standards").
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:1 (Michie 1993).
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2. General Statutes Containing Unconditional Restrctions.-Two
states have statutes that unconditionally restrict the authority of state
agencies to promulgate any environmental regulations more stringent
than federal regulations. A South Dakota statute addressing air pollu-
tion control, water pollution control, and several other forms of envi-
ronmental control prohibits promulgation of rules that are "more
stringent than any corresponding federal law, rule, or regulation gov-
erning an essentially similar subject or issue." 8 Similarly, Kentucky's
statute relating to the adoption of administrative regulations provides
that "[a]n administrative body may adopt administrative regulations
to implement a statute only when the ... [legislature] specifically au-
thorizes the adoption of such regulations or such regulations are re-
quired by federal law, in which case such regulations shall be no more
stringent than the federal law or regulations. " ' Although the Ken-
tucky statute does not relate solely to environmental regulation, Ken-
tucky has several other statutes that deal specifically with air
pollution,"° hazardous wastess l and surface mining3 2 which are consis-
tent with the aforementioned statute in prohibiting promulgation of
regulations more stringent than federal law.
B. Statutes Imposing a Conditional Restriction on State Agency Authority
Statutes imposing a conditional restriction on state agency au-
thority generally contain some language, the exact phrasing of which
varies from state to state, prohibiting an agency from promulgating
standards or regulations more stringent than federal law unless
unique circumstances justify more stringent regulations. These stat-
utes also may permit or require the appropriate agency to make a
28. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 1-40-4.1 (1993).
29. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13A.120(1) (Baldwin 1993).
30. Section 224.10-100(26) provides that the environmental protection cabinet may
.preserve existing clean air resources while ensuring economic growth by issuing regula-
tions, which shall be no more stringent than federal requirements, setting maximum allow-
able increases from stationary sources over baseline concentrations of air contaminants to
prevent significant deterioration in areas meeting the state and national ambient air qual-
ity standards." Id. § 224.10-100(26).
31. Section 224.46-510 provides that regulations relating to generators of hazardous
waste "shall be no more stringent than the federal requirements" and that criteria and lists
for identifying hazardous waste "shall be identical to any such criteria and lists proposed or
promulgated by the United States Environmental Protection Agency." Id. § 224.46-510(1)
(Hist. Note), (3).
32. Sections 350.028, 350.069 and 350.465 provide that administrative regulations re-
lating to surface mining and surface mining operation performance standards shall be "no
more stringent than" provided for in the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977. Id. §§ 350.028, .069, .465(2).
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specific finding, sometimes following a hearing, about the need for
the more stringent regulation under given criteria.
1. Media-Specific and Subject-Specific Statutes Requiing Satisfaction
of a Condition or of Specific Procedures.--Several states have media-spe-
cific or subject-specific statutes that limit an agency's authority to pro-
mulgate regulations or standards more stringent than federal law
except after satisfaction of certain criteria or procedures.
a. Air Pollution. -Oklahoma and Rhode Island have statutes
imposing conditional constraints on the authority of their respective
state environmental agencies concerning the regulation of certain as-
pects of their air pollution programs. Oklahoma's statute provides
that the state must establish a program for implementing and enforc-
ing the federal emission standards for hazardous air pollutants under
section 112 of the Clean Air Act "that is consistent with and not more
stringent than the federal requirements." 3  The statute further pro-
vides, however, for the adoption of "rules which establish emission
limitations for hazardous air pollutants which are more stringent than
the applicable federal standards upon a determination. . . that more
stringent standards are necessary to protect public health." 4 The stat-
ute also authorizes establishment of "a separate and distinct program
only for the control of the emission of those toxic air contaminants
not otherwise regulated by a final emission standard under Section
112(d) of the Federal Clean Air Act."3 5
Rhode Island's statute imposes a similar conditional constraint.
The statute addresses regulation of the emission characteristics of all
fuels used by stationary and mobile sources of air contaminants. The
statute provides that such regulations "shall not be more stringent
than the mandatory standards established by federal law or regulation,
unless it can be shown that such control technology and emission
characteristics of fuels are needed for the attainment or maintenance
of air quality standards."'
Missouri, 7 West Virginia" and Pennsylvania3 9 have statutes re-
quiring written findings regarding the need for a more stringent rule.
33. OiKu. STAT. ANN. tit. 27A, § 2-5-114 (West Supp. 1994). To assure that the state
program is consistent with and not more stringent than the federal requirements, the stat-
ute further provides that any rule "regarding hazardous air pollutants and regulated sub-
stances shall only be [promulgated] by adoption by reference of final federal rules." Id.
34. Id. § 2-5-114(A) (2).
35. Id. § 2-5-114(B).
36. R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-23-5(12) (1993).
37. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 643.055(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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Missouri's statute' authorizes the promulgation of standards and
guidelines to ensure compliance with the Clean Air Act, provided that
[t]he standards and guidelines so established shall not be
any stricter than those required under the provisions of the
federal Clean Air Act, as amended; nor shall those standards
and guidelines be enforced in any area of the state prior to
the time required by the federal Clean Air Act, as
amended.41
Section 643.055.1 of the Missouri Act further provides, however, that
[t]he restrictions of this section shall not apply to the parts
of the state implementation plan developed by the commis-
sion to bring a nonattainment area into compliance and to
maintain compliance when needed to have a[n] ...ap-
proved state implementation plan. The determination of
which parts of a state implementation plan are not subject to
the restrictions of this section shall be based upon specific
findings of fact by the air conservation commission as to the
rules, regulations and criteria that are needed to have a[n]
... approved plan.42
West Virginia's statute43 provides that no legislative rule or pro-
gram relating to air pollution "shall be any more stringent than any
federal rule or program except to the limited extent that... [there is]
a specific written finding for any such departure that there exists sci-
entifically supportable evidence for such rule or program reflecting
factors unique to West Virginia or some area thereof."'
Pennsylvania has a statute imposing a similar constraint on one
very specific aspect of its air pollution control program. Penn-
sylvania's statute forbids "a more stringent performance or emission
standard for hazardous air pollutant emissions from existing sources"
than the standard in federal regulations establishing performance or
emission standards under section 112 of the Clean Air Act.45 The
Pennsylvania statute contains an exception, however, allowing operat-
ing practice requirements or emission standards based on health risk
"when needed to protect public health, welfare and the environment
38. W. VA. CODE § 22-5-4(a)(4) (1994).
39. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4006.6 (1993).
40. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 643.055(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. W. VA. CODE § 22-5-4(a)(4) (1994).
44. Id.
45. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 4006.6(a), (d)(1) (1993).
1382 [VOL. 54:1373
LIMITATIONS ON STATE AGENCY AUTHORITY
from emissions of hazardous air pollutants, " ' provided that the
agency explains the need for such standards or requirements.47 The
statute also authorizes state agencies to establish "performance or
emission standards for sources or categories of sources absent from
the list of source categories established under Section 112(c) of the
Clean Air Act."4"
b. Underground Storage Tanks.-Regarding regulation of un-
derground storage tanks, three states impose some type of conditional
constraint on a state agency's authority to promulgate standards more
stringent than federal law requires. For example, Texas has a statute
prohibiting the imposition of "standards or rules more stringent than
the federal requirements unless . . . the more stringent standards or
rules are necessary to protect human health or the environment."49
Oklahoma has a statute providing that for "any rule that is different
from a federal standard or regulation on the same subject,"5" the
agency must state the deviation from the federal standard or regula-
tion and the reason for the deviation "at a public hearing or at the
time of adoption of the rule."5 1 Oregon likewise authorizes the estab-
lishment of: (1) performance standards for underground storage
tanks "consistent with standards adopted by the Federal Government";
and (2) "[r]equirements for soil assessment and tank tightness tests
46. Id. In the case of coke oven batteries, however, the statute prohibits promulgation
of "health risk-based emission standards more stringent than Federal requirements until
eight (8) years after promulgation of maximum achievable control technology (MACT)
standards and not until the year 2020 for Coke Oven Batteries which satisfy the require-
ments of Section 112(i) (8) (A) of the Clean Air Act." Id. § 4006.6(d) (2). The statute pro-
vides an exception, however, "where the operation of a coke oven battery would result in
serious substantial and demonstrable harm to public health, welfare and the environ-
ment," in which case the state agency may impose health risk-based emission standards that
use proven commercially and economically available methods of technology. Id.
§ 4006.6(d) (2), (3).
47. Id. § 4006.6(d). The statute also provides for public review and comments on plan
approvals, operating permits, guidelines, and regulations that contain health risk-based
emissions standards or operating practice requirements. Id.
48. Id. Additionally, if the federal government fails to promulgate a standard to con-
trol the emissions of hazardous air pollutants under § 112 of the Clean Air Act, "pursuant
to a schedule to establish pursuant to Section 112(c) of the Clean Air Act," the statute
authorizes promulgation of "a performance or emission standard on a case-by-case basis for
individual sources or categories of sources." Id. § 4006.6(b).
49. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.357(b) (West 1993).
50. OKLA. STAT. tit. 17, § 307(D) (1993).
51. Id. But see supra note 26 (discussing tit. 17, § 308 of the Oklahoma Statutes, which
provides that regulations regarding financial responsibility coverage with respect to under-
ground storage tanks "shall not be more stringent than is required by the federal Environ-
mental Protection Agency for underground storage tank systems of equal type, age, and
classification").
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which shall not be more stringent ... than required by the Federal
Government."52 The Oregon statute provides an exception, however,
when "[ m ] ore stringent rules are necessary: (A) To protect ... sensi-
tive environmental amenit[ies]; or (B) Because conditions peculiar to
that area require different standards to protect public health, safety,
welfare or the environment."5 3 The statute further states that if "any
standard or rule... is different than [sic] a federal standard or regula-
tion on the same subject, the report submitted . . . at the time the
commission adopts the standard or rule shall indicate clearly the
deviation from the federal standard or regulation and the reason for
deviation." 4
c. Water Pollution. -Regarding the regulation of water pollu-
tion, three states impose some type of conditional constraint on the
authority of a state agency to promulgate standards more stringent
than federal law requires. In two states, the specific circumstances
under which an agency may promulgate more stringent standards in-
volve compliance with water quality standards. 5
Arkansas has a statute concerning water pollution control that re-
quires conditions in permits assuring the achievement of effluent limi-
tations through the application of treatment technology and
processes at the levels the Clean Water Act mandates "or any more
stringent effluent limitations necessary to meet water quality criteria
or toxic standards established pursuant to any state or federal law or
regulation."56 Iowa has a similar statute relating to the establishment
of water quality standards, pretreatment standards, and effluent stan-
dards. The statute provides that if the EPA "has promulgated an efflu-
ent standard or pretreatment standard pursuant to section 301, 306 or
307 of the federal Water Pollution Control Act, a pretreatment or ef-
fluent standard adopted pursuant to this section shall not be more
stringent than the federal effluent or pretreatment standard for such
source." 7 This statute, however, does "not preclude the establish-
ment of a more restrictive effluent limitation in the permit for a par-
ticular point source if the more restrictive effluent limitation is
necessary to meet water quality standards.""
52. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 466.746(l)(a), (1)(0 (1993).
53. Id. § 466.746(2) (a).
54. Id. § 466.746(4).
55. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
56. ARs- CODE AN. § 8-4-207(1)(A) (Michie 1993).
57. IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.173(2) (West 1993).
58. Id.
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Colorado has a statute that provides for the adoption of rules
more stringent than corresponding federal requirements "only if it is
demonstrated at a public hearing, and [there is a finding], based on
sound scientific or technical evidence in the record, that [such] rules
... are necessary to protect the public health, beneficial use of water,
or the environment of the state."59
2. General Statutes Requiring Satisfaction of Specific Procedures.-
Four states, Florida, North Dakota, Oklahoma and West Virginia have
statutes that generally require state agencies interested in promulgat-
ing environmental regulations more stringent than federal regula-
tions to comply with specific procedures. Florida's statute, which
relates to environmental regulations generally, requires a cost/benefit
analysis of "any proposed standard that would be stricter or more
stringent than one which has been set by federal agencies pursuant to
federal law or regulation."6" Much like Florida's statute, Oklahoma's
statute requires each state environmental agency "to determine the
economic impact and environmental benefit" of "any rule that is more
stringent than corresponding federal requirements."6' North Da-
kota's statute prohibits the adoption of any rule providing for state
administration of
a program under the federal Clean Air Act, federal Clean
Water Act, federal Safe Drinking Water Act, federal Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, federal Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, fed-
eral Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act
of 1986, federal Toxic Substances Control Act, or federal
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, [that] may be more stringent
than corresponding federal regulations which address the
same circumstances.62
The North Dakota statute, however, allows for adoption of
rules more stringent than corresponding federal regulations
or... rules [for which] there are no corresponding federal
regulations.... only... [upon] a written finding after pub-
lic comment and hearing based upon evidence in the rec-
59. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-8-202(8) (a) (West 1994).
60. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.804(2) (West 1993). Two separate statutes, one relating to
regulation of air and water pollution, and the other addressing solid waste management,
cross-reference the procedures set forth in § 403.804 as the prerequisites for adoption of
regulations more stringent than federal law requires. Id. § 403.061(7) (regarding air and
water pollution) & § 403.704(15) (regarding solid waste management).
61. OKLA. STAT. tit. 27A, § 1-1-206 (1994).
62. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-04.1.1 (1993).
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ord, that corresponding federal regulations are not adequate
to protect public health and the environment of the state. 63
West Virginia's statute provides that the Director of the Division
of Environmental Protection may promulgate rules "more stringent
than the counterpart federal rule or program to the extent that the
director first provides specific written reasons which demonstrate that
such provisions are reasonably necessary to protect, preserve or en-
hance the quality of West Virginia's environment or human health or
safety."6 The statute further provides that "[i]n the absence of a fed-
eral rule, the adoption of a state rule shall not be construed to be
more stringent than a federal rule, unless the absence of a federal rule
is the result of a specific federal exemption."6
In addition, Utah employs statutory language similar to North Da-
kota's. Utah lacks one general statute conditionally prohibiting the
promulgation of regulations more stringent than federal law, how-
ever. Instead, it has several subject-specific statutes that incorporate
language prohibiting promulgation of regulations "more stringent
than the corresponding federal regulations," absent "a written finding
after public comment and hearing .... that the corresponding federal
regulation is not adequate to protect public safety and the
environment."66
Finally, Tennessee recently enacted a statute allowing for the
Tennessee Government Operations Committee to invalidate rules
that impose "environmental requirements or restrictions on munici-
palities or counties that are more stringent than federal statutes or
rules on the same subject, and that result in increased expenditure
requirements on municipalities or counties beyond those required to
meet federal requirements unless" funds have been appropriated to
cover the increased expenditures.67
63. Id. § 23-01-04.1.2.
64. W. VA. CODE § 22-1-3a (1994).
65. Id.
66. UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-2-106(1), (2) (1993) (relating to air pollution); § 19-4-
105(1), (2) (relating to safe drinking water); § 19-5-105(1), (2) (relating to water pollu-
tion); § 19-6-106(1), (2) (relating to state administration of RCRA, CERCLA and the Emer-
gency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986); § 40-10-6.5(1), (2) (relating
to surface coal mining and reclamation).
67. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-225 (1994).
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II. ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE REASONS FOR, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
OF, THE INCREASING STATE LEGISLATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON STATE
AGENCY PROMULGATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
When a state legislature enacts enabling legislation imposing an
unconditional constraint on a state environmental agency's authority
to promulgate rules more stringent than federal environmental legis-
lation, the state legislature-to an extent that the state legislature
does not always clearly define 68-effectively shifts to Congress and fed-
eral agencies the responsibility for specific policy decisions on the
scope of environmental regulation in the state. In enacting these leg-
islative constraints on state agency authority, state legislators essen-
tially express general satisfaction with the way Congress and/or
federal agencies have resolved, or may resolve,69 political battles over
the scope of environmental regulation. In addition, state legislatures
express confidence that the process of developing federal environ-
mental legislation or regulations has sufficiently addressed, and will
continue to address, their constituents concerns such that they do not
need to provide their constituents with an opportunity to revisit such
issues at the state administrative level.70
A. Reasons for State Legislative Constraints
Why might the members of an increasing number of state legisla-
tures decide to constrain their state environmental agencies from im-
posing standards more stringent than federal environmental laws and
regulations? The following sections explore several possible
explanations.
68. See infra Part HI (discussing the extent to which ambiguities in statutory language
create interpretive problems concerning the extent of the agency's authority).
69. Several state statutes implicitly or explicitly contemplate the possibility of an evolv-
ing federal standard. See, e.g., Mo. Rxv. STAT. § 643.055.1 (1993) (referencing the "Clean
Air Act, as amended"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-4-4 (Michie 1993) (referencing the "Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as amended"). Although some of these statutory
constraints may be subject to state constitutional challenges because they delegate exces-
sive authority or are unconstitutionally vague, such constitutional questions are beyond the
scope of the present analysis. Instead, this Article focuses solely on interpretive issues that
arise under these types of statutes, with the goal of providing guidance to legislatures that
may be considering enacting such statutory constraints, and to agencies, regulated parties
and courts, each of whom may have to assess the scope of these types of statutes.
70. Ifa statute contains a conditional, rather than an unconditional, constraint on state
agency authority, the statute would, in all likelihood, not preclude concerned citizens from
addressing interpretive issues at the state administrative level, but would constitute an addi-
tional hurdle for concerned citizens pursuing such issues through state agencies.
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1. Economic Concerns.-The first possible explanation arises from
the increasing demands on state coffers generally, and the perception
that federal environmental legislation imposes "unfunded federal
mandates" on the states. 71 Even as state legislatures accept fiscal re-
sponsibility for a regulatory program by implementing enabling legis-
lation, they understandably may desire to preclude state
environmental agencies from promulgating rules or regulations that
place additional stress on state budgets.
Another possible explanation lies in the private sector compli-
ance costs of increasingly complex environmental regulations.72 State
legislatures, again, understandably may decide to protect local indus-
try from additional compliance costs by precluding state environmen-
tal agencies from promulgating rules or regulations that impose
additional demands on the regulated community.73 Given that state
legislatures may believe that their state is competing with other states
for industrial and commercial development, state legislatures also un-
71. See William Claiborne, Reining In Unfunded Mandates: Bill Would Require Congress to
Estimate the Cost of Installing Laws, WASH. PosT, June 17, 1994, at A23 ("Unfunded man-
dates-the pass-along of complying with hundreds of federal laws and regulations adopted
by Congress without providing funds to pay for them-have become an increasing concern
for governors, mayors, and county officials faced with budget crises."); Unfunded Mandates:
Cities, States Said to be Caught in Squeeze Bdwn Wave of Regulations, No Fed Funds, Daily Env.
Rep. (BNA), Mar. 23, 1994. Notably, the 104th Congress responded to some of the states'
concerns by enacting unfunded mandates legislation earlier this year. Unfunded Man-
dates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995).
72. See, e.g., Air Pollution: Compliance With Clean Air Act Rules Costly to Small Businesses,
Report Says, Daily Env. Rep. (BNA), Nov. 9, 1992 (describing costs of compliance with un-
derground storage tank regulations and Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990); Michael
Silverstein, Facing a Huge Environmental Debt, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 25, 1989, at 13 (discussing
overall costs of cleaning up the environment and complying with environmental
regulations).
73. See Missouri Hosp. Ass'n v. Air Conservation Comm'n, 874 S.W.2d 380 (Mo. CL
App. 1994). Reflecting on the policy choice the General Assembly made in enacting
§ 643.055.1 of the Missouri Statutes, the court stated:
[T] he General Assembly clearly recognized the burden imposed on the regulated
community in attempting to comply with three separate levels of laws and regula-
tions (federal, state and local), as well as the extreme difficulty of trying to comply
with multiple bodies of regulations in given areas. It further understood that
where there are two or more sets of standards and guidelines with which those
affected by regulations must comply, the enormous compliance costs could devas-
tate Missouri's economy and lead to job losses for its citizens. The General As-
sembly therefore concluded that it was essential to the well being of the state's
economy and its workers that Missouri follow federal law and regulations (where
they exist) in the area of air quality, for the dual purposes of assuring industry
and the regulated community that they would only need to meet the require-
ments of a single regulatory scheme, as well as assuring the public that air quality
would be protected by compliance with the federal Clean Air Act.
Id. at 397.
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derstandably may seek a competitive advantage by minimizing the
state agencies' ability to impose environmental regulations.7 1
A final possible explanation lies in the principle of externalities,
that is, the shifting of some costs to other jurisdictions, generally by
sending uncontrolled pollution across state lines. Again, state legisla-
tures understandably may want to prevent the state environmental
agency from requiring internalization of expensive and unpleasant ex-
ternalities through more stringent regulations.75
The more powerfully organized lobbying presence of industry
and trade groups, as compared to environmentalists, at the state legis-
lative level, makes all the more plausible each of these rationales for
state legislative constraints on the promulgation of state environmen-
tal regulations that exceed federal requirements. 76
2. Institutional Concerns.-If a state legislature distrusts its state
agencies,7 7 or believes that the federal government's regulatory system
74. Commentators disagree about whether lax environmental regulations serve as an
incentive that lures industry to a state or retains industry within a state. Compare Stewart,
supra note 1, at 1212 ("Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state
or community may rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high environmental standards
... for fear that the resulting environmental gains will be more than offset by movement of
capital to other areas with lower standards.") and Environmental Regulations Force Commerce
Out of State, Business Roundtable Survey Finds, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1839 (Nov. 29, 1991)
("Excessive environmental regulation is one of the top reasons one of three businesses in
California will relocate...."); with CHRISTOPHERJ. DUERKSEN, ENviRONMENrAL REGULATION
OF INDUSTRIAL PLANT SITING: How TO MAKE IT WoR BETrER 58-71 (1983) (suggesting that
environmental regulations, in comparison with other factors, have little effect on siting
decisions) and HOWARD A. STAFFORD, PRINCIPLES OF INDUSTRIAL FACILrI LOC ATION 76-83
(1979) (same). Nonetheless, the mere perception that nonuniformity in environmental
regulation matters to industry may be enough to trigger a legislative reaction. See WILLIAM
R. LOWRY, THE DIMENSIONS OF FEDERALISM: STATE GOVERNMENTS AND POLLUTION CONTROL
PouCIES 13-14 (1992); David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular
Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Authority is Shared by the United States, the States,
and Their Citizens, 54 MD. L REV. 1552 (1995).
75. See LowRy, supra note 74, at 14; Stewart, supra note 1, at 1215-16.
76. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 1213-14. Stewart posits that, at the state level
[i]ndustrial firms, developers, unions and others with incentives to avoid environ-
mental controls are typically well-organized economic units with a large stake in
particular decisions. The countervailing interest in environmental quality is
shared by individuals whose personal stake is small and who face formidable
transaction costs in organizing for concerted action. These factors tend to pro-
duce more effective and informed representation before legislative and adminis-
trative decisionmakers of interests favoring economic development as opposed to
those favoring environmental quality.
Id. at 1213 (citations omitted). See generaly GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER & AMERI-
CAN DEMOCRACY (1967) (discussing the power of private interests in influencing govern-
ment policy).
77. See Kenneth D. Dean, Legislative Veto of Administrative Rules in Missouri: A Constitu-
tional Virus, 57 Mo. L. REv. 1157, 1159-61, 1184-85 (1992) (discussing generally growth in
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goes too far,78 a state legislature understandably might embrace the
general grant and general constraint approach to state enabling legis-
lation. Such an approach assures the state legislature that state envi-
ronmental standards are coextensive with federal law, thus allowing
the state to obtain state authorization to administer the regulatory re-
gime79 without risking overreaching by the state environmental
agency. With the increasing complexity of federal environmental leg-
islation,8 ° state legislatures also might embrace a general grant and
general constraint approach to state enabling legislation to avoid the
resource demands of learning every nuance of federal environmental
legislation and the burden of drafting enabling legislation specifically
matching state standards to the detailed federal mandate.8 1
B. Policy Implications of State Legislative Constraints on State Agency
Authority
State agencies are creatures of statute whose authority comes
from the state legislature. Therefore, there is nothing inherently
wrong with a state legislature constraining the authority of a state envi-
use of legislative veto as a control over administrative rule-making and discussing specifi-
cally dispute between the Missouri Department of Natural Resources and the Missouri
General Assembly). For another example of the legislative veto, see supra note 67 and
accompanying text, discussing 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 878 (S.B. 2040) (codified at TENN.
CODE ANN. § 4-5-225 (1994) (authorizing the Tennessee Government Operations Commit-
tee to invalidate certain environmental rules)).
78. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 1219-22.
79. By obtaining state authorization for administration of federal environmental pro-
grams, the state obtains primary enforcement authority. See supra notes 9-10 and accompa-
nying text.
80. See Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENvrL.
L. 1721, 1742 (1991) (noting that "[t]o an extent unprecedented in prior environmental
statutes, the pollution control programs of the 1990 Amendments include very detailed
mandatory directives to EPA," and observing that the page proofs for the final conference
report "were more than 700 pages long").
81. See Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatoy Forms: Legal Process or Administra-
tive Process, 39 PuB. CHOICE 33, 44-52 (1982) (noting that, by enacting vague legislation,
legislatures not only avoid the time and trouble involved in making difficult decisions, but
also shift some of the responsibility for the consequences of decisions); cf. Lowav, supra
note 74, at 12 (describing strong incentives that exist for national policy- makers to pass
vague legislation and leave details to others). For example, as evidence of its desire to shift
responsibility for the consequences of its decision to expand automobile inspection and
maintenance programs in the St. Louis metropolitan area, the Missouri General Assembly
recently enacted legislation requiring that each inspection station conspicuously post a
sign on the premises, "which is at least eight feet high and sixteen feet wide" bearing the
following legend: "This inspection is mandated by the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency under powers granted to it by your United States Senators and Representa-
tives in Washington, D.C." 1994 Mo. Laws 590. The legislation further provides that "[t]he
certificate or approval issued shall bear the legend: 'This cost is mandated by your United
States Congress.'" Id.
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ronmental agency. There also is nothing inherently wrong with a
state legislature transferring to the federal government the responsi-
bility for environmental policy-making. This is particularly true when
the state legislature believes that Congress or EPA has gone far
enough in setting national standards and fears the economic conse-
quences of regulations more stringent than federal law.
One can question, however, the empirical validity of a state legis-
lature's implicit presumption that the resolution of national political
battles definitively addresses the desires of the state's citizens. First,
environmental issues of concern to a state's citizens might not be of
sufficient national significance to have entered the national debate. 2
Second, as noted above, certain constituencies at the state level-spe-
cifically, commercial and industrial entities that generally favor state
legislation limiting the authority of state environmental agencies-
may have a greater voice in the state legislature than those constituen-
cies interested in additional state regulation. 3
Even if a federal environmental statute or regulation initially sat-
isfies citizens of a particular state, a state legislature's enactment of
constraints on a state environmental agency's authority creates the po-
tential for problems in the long term. At a minimum, such a con-
straint increases the burden citizens will face when seeking additional
regulation administratively, as the agency will have to comply with the
constraining statute before promulgating further, stricter regulations.
When the constraint the state legislature enacts is unconditional, the
legislature entirely precludes citizens from pursuing additional regula-
tion in an administrative forum. Consequently, citizens interested in
pursuing additional regulation must take their campaign either to the
state legislature, which retains the authority to enact legislation impos-
ing more stringent regulations than federal law requires, or to Con-
gress or a federal administrative agency. Therefore, although state
legislation does not completely foreclose the possibility of additional
82. For instance, the Clean Air Act does not regulate charcoal kilns as a source cate-
gory, even though charcoal kilns create significant pollution. This omission occurred
largely because pollution problems associated with charcoal kilns exist primarily in Mis-
souri, which is the leading producer of charcoal in the country. Conversation with Cindy
Kemper, Director of Air Pollution Control Program, Missouri Department of Natural Re-
sources (June 28, 1993).
83. See supra note 76. Professor Stewart suggests that because environmental groups
are at a "comparative disadvantage" at the state level, they can "exert far more leverage by
organizing into one or a few units at the national level." Stewart, supra note 1, at 1213-15.
This might explain why some state governments believe the federal government's environ-
mental mandates are sufficiently protective. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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regulation, it does greatly decrease the impact of citizens' participa-
tion in environmental policy-making.
State legislative constraints on state environmental agencies' au-
thority to promulgate regulations more stringent than federal law also
implicate larger concerns. To the extent that state legislatures pre-
vent state environmental agencies from promulgating regulations
more stringent than federal law, such states will fail to fulfill their role
as "laboratories" within our federal system.8 4 Several states have rel-
ished their roles as laboratories, developing standards more stringent
than federal environmental legislation requires.8 5 Those state legisla-
tures that have enacted constraints on the authority of state environ-
mental agencies, however, have opted out of serving as "laboratories,"
or at least have chosen to experiment in areas other than those sub-
ject to the statutory constraint.8 6
Do these developments in the states tell us anything about the
validity of the "Tragedy of the Commons" or "race to the bottom" ra-
tionale for environmental regulation at the federal level? 7 On the
one hand, the existence of "laboratory" states, which are willing to
enact regulations more stringent than federal law requires, may sug-
gest that the "race to the bottom" is just a myth. On the other hand,
the existence of states that make the federal minimum standards their
own maximum may suggest that the "race to the bottom" is a legiti-
mate concern. The existence of "laboratory" states, however, does not
necessarily negate the possibility of a "race to the bottom" in the ab-
84. HenryJ. Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019, 1034 (1977) (quoting
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.").
85. See LowRy, supra note 74. Lowry discusses four instances of "state leadership," in
which states have developed programs that exceed the federal minimum requirements.
Four states Lowry identifies as leaders include Wisconsin (air pollution regulation), North
Carolina (point source water pollution regulation), Iowa (nonpoint source water pollution
regulation) and California (mobile source air pollution regulation). Id. at 27-120; see also
Revesz, supra note 1, at 1228-29 (citing other examples of states or municipalities develop-
ing environmental regulations more stringent than federal law requires).
86. In many respects, the wave of state legislation imposing statutory constraints on
state agency authority to promulgate regulations more stringent than federal law is merely
another manifestation of the states' reluctance to implement the federal environmental
agenda, a reluctance Professor Stewart highlighted in his seminal article in 1977. See Stew-
art, supra note 1.
87. Stewart refers to this phenomenon as a "Tragedy of the Commons" problem. Stew-
art, supra note 1, at 1211-12. Revesz refers to it as a "race to the bottom" problem. Revesz,
supra note 1, at 1210-11.
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sence of federal minimum standards.88 Similarly, the existence of
"federal minimum/state maximum" states does not necessarily
demonstrate that the absence of federal minimum standards would
trigger a "race to the bottom."89 Nonetheless, the trend among state
legislatures to embrace federal minimum standards as state maximum
standards, viewed in the context of the states' historical failure to pro-
duce socially desirable environmental improvements through state
legislation and regulation,9 ° provides some evidence that the concern
about a "race to the bottom" in the absence of federal minimum stan-
dards remains valid.9 1
88. One would not expect that the states embracing federal minimum standards as
their maximum standards to affect the experimentation occurring in "laboratory" states.
These "laboratory" states presumably already understand the extent to which their stan-
dards differ from the federal minimum. Nonetheless, the existence of these "federal mini-
mum/state maximum" states allows an inference that the federal government either has
reached or has gone beyond what many states would view as the appropriate level of regu-
lation in particular areas. Therefore, the absence of a federal minimum could foreseeably
jeopardize the experimentation of "laboratory" states in the following manner. If certain
"minimalist" states were to lower their environmental standards, then the difference be-
tween their regulatory regimes and those in "laboratory" states would be greater than
under the current system. This greater difference likely would impose more pressure on
"laboratory" states to refrain from additional regulation or to reduce their experimenta-
tion. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1227-33 (suggesting that even though some states establish
an equilibrium at a standard more stringent than federal law when federal law establishes a
minimum standard, they also might establish an equilibrium at a /ess stringent, suboptimally
lax standard in the absence of a federal minimum).
89. The existence of "federal minimum/state maximum" states allows more than one
inference-that the federal government either (1) just has reached, or (2) has gone be-
yond-what many states would view as the appropriate level of regulation in particular
areas. Therefore, the existence of "federal minimum/state maximum" states does not re-
quire the conclusion that without federal minimum standards some states would lower
their environmental standards. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1236-44 (reviewing three mod-
els from economic literature and concluding that "race-to-the-bottom arguments in the
environmental area have been made for the last two decades with essentially no theoretical
foundation" because state competition does not necessarily reduce social welfare).
90. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
91. The theoretical framework Revesz establishes for his assertion that the "race-to-the-
bottom" rationale might be unsupportable suggests that "interstate competition is not in-
consistent with the maximization of social welfare." Revesz acknowledges, however, that if
states fail to act in an economically rational manner, interstate competition will lead to
suboptimal results. Revesz, supra note 1, at 1242-43. Revesz suggests that this "outcome is
due to an 'error' on the part of state regulators rather than to a structural failure of state
autonomy in a federal system." Id. This argument, however, may be little more than a
semantic distinction. One can argue just as easily that in the real world a state govern-
ment's failure to act in an economically rational manner is a given, to be viewed as part of
the "structural failure of state autonomy in a federal system," id., given that state govern-
ments are comprised of decision-makers who are not perfectly rational and who must base
decisions on imperfect information.
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III. INTERPRETIVE PROBLEMS OF STATE LEGISLATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON
THE AUTHORITY OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCIES TO
PROMULGATE STANDARDS MORE STRINGENT THAN
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Through constraints on state agency authority, state legislatures
delegate some responsibility for environmental policy-making to Con-
gress, EPA, and other federal agencies. This practice raises a signifi-
cant issue, with both policy and practical implications, concerning the
scope of the delegation. When a state legislature prohibits a state
agency from promulgating standards more stringent than federal law,
to what extent is the state legislature limiting the authority of the state
agency? To what extent is the state legislature agreeing with the reso-
lution of environmental policy disputes at the national level?
For example, when Congress has decided to regulate the emis-
sion of certain pollutants from certain sources, and a state legislature
authorizes a state agency to promulgate only regulations that are no
more stringent than federal law, the state legislature may be saying
one of three things:
(1) It agrees with Congress's explicit choice to regulate the
emission of certain pollutants from certain sources, such that
the state agency lacks the authority to promulgate any regu-
lation different from the federal regulations with respect to
the emission of such pollutants from such sources. With re-
spect to the emission of other pollutants from such sources,
however, or with respect to other sources, the state agency
retains the authority to promulgate regulations. Or,
(2) It agrees with Congress's explicit or implicit choice to
regulate only the emission of certain pollutants from certain
sources, such that the state agency lacks authority to promul-
gate any regulation that differs from the federal regulation
with respect to the emission either of such pollutants from
such sources, or of other pollutants from such sources. With
respect to other sources, however, the state agency retains
the authority to promulgate regulations. Or,
(3) It agrees with Congress's explicit or implicit choice to
regulate only the emission of certain pollutants only from
certain sources, such that the state agency lacks the authority
to regulate any pollutants or any sources other than those
Congress has regulated.
Thus, regardless of whether a state statute contains an uncondi-
tional constraint or a conditional constraint on a state environmental
agency's authority, and regardless of the statute's subject matter, such
statutory constraints generally present three problems of statutory in-
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terpretation.92 The first interpretive problem concerns whether these
constraints limit an agency's authority to impose "additional regula-
tions" on sources that federal environmental legislation regulates.93
The second interpretive problem concerns how much these con-
straints limit an agency's authority to regulate "additional sources"
that federal environmental legislation does not regulate. 94
A third interpretive problem arises from the Clean Air Act's and
Clean Water Act's requirements of compliance with both ambient
standards and source-specific standards. The interpretive problem
concerns how much state legislative constraints limit an agency's au-
thority to impose pollutant-specific, source-specific standards more
stringent than the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act in order to com-
ply with the general ambient standards imposed by the Clean Air Act
and Clean Water Act.95
The following analysis highlights how a state legislature's use of
simple language in framing a constraint on the authority of a state
agency may cause each of these interpretive problems, because the
simple language is irreconcilable with the inherent complexity of a
given federal regulatory regime. Because this Part of the Article
merely highlights these three interpretive issues, it makes no attempt
to construe each statute discussed in the context of each state's ap-
proach to statutory interpretation. Rather, this Part adopts the prem-
ise that one of the fundamental rules of statutory construction is to
look solely at the plain meaning of the language, in context, to deter-
mine whether any ambiguity exists that would invoke additional rules
of statutory construction. 9 Therefore, this Part of the Article merely
92. The interpretive issues arise whether the statute contains an unconditional or con-
ditional constraint because, in either instance, the agency must determine whether the
proposed rule falls within the scope of the statutory constraint. The impact of a statute
containing an unconditional constraint differs from the impact of a statute containing a
conditional constraint only because the former prohibits promulgation of any rule which
falls within its mandate while the latter simply requires that an agency comply with a given
procedure before promulgating a rule that falls within the statutory mandate. With that in
mind, an unconditional constraint clearly favors the status quo more than a conditional
constraint, because the existence of the condition gives the agency a means to regulate that
the unconditional constraint completely forecloses.
93. See infra Part III.A.
94. See infra Part III.B.
95. See supra Part III.C.
96. See NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 45.02, 46.01
(5th ed. 1992) (discussing the problem of ambiguity and the plain meaning rule).
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attempts to identify those statutes that appear facially ambiguous9 7 or
unambiguous.98
A. Impact on Regulation of Pollutants Not Regulated Under Federal Law
Assume that a state legislature passes a statute directing the state
environmental agency to promulgate regulations concerning air pol-
lution, provided that the state environmental agency may not promul-
gate any rules more stringent than federal law. Assume also that the
state environmental agency proposes, for sources regulated under the
Clean Air Act, regulations that include additional pollutants not cov-
ered by the Clean Air Act. Under these circumstances, would the state
environmental agency be acting beyond its authority by attempting to
impose a standard more stringent than federal law?
To answer this question, one must answer the following ques-
tions: When state legislation prohibits a state environmental agency
from promulgating standards more stringent than federal law, what
does the state legislature mean? Does it agree with the nature of the
federal regulation of certain sources, such that with respect to those
sources, the state environmental agency may promulgate only regula-
tions coextensive with the federal environmental legislation? Or does
the state legislature mean that it agrees with the federal regulation of
certain pollutants from certain sources, such that the state environ-
mental agency may not promulgate more stringent standards relating
to those specific pollutants from those specific sources, but may pro-
mulgate standards for "additional pollutants" from those sources,
which pollutants the federal environmental legislation omits?'
97. Statutes have been classified as ambiguous to the extent that they are reasonably
susceptible to two or more interpretations. Cf SINGER, supra note 96, §§ 45.02, 46.01
("Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of inter-
pretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discus-
sion."). The classifications in this part of the Article are based solely on the author's view
of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language taken in context, as amplified by any
judicial decisions or attorney general opinions that address issues relating to interpretation
of the statute. As the following discussion highlights, the judicial decisions and attorneys
general opinions frequently provide no greater clarity than the statutes themselves. See
infra Part IIIA3 (discussing decisions by courts of appeals in Florida and Missouri and an
attorney general's opinion from New Mexico).
98. Because all three interpretive issues arise under the Clean Air Act, this analysis
focuses primarily on statutes relating to that Act. The analysis includes classification of
virtually all of the other state statutes discussed in Part I, however, because many of the
statutes, regardless of whether they relate to the regulation of air pollution, water pollu-
tion, or underground storage tanks, contain some ambiguous language creating one or
more of these interpretive problems.
99. These two options presuppose that Congress and EPA have been silent on the ques-
tion of whether they have decided to decline to regulate certain pollutants. Clearly, any
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1. Statutes That Fairly Clearly Limit the State Agency's Authority to
Regulate Additional Pollutants from Regulated Sources. -An Iowa statute
concerning water quality contains a source-specific constraint that
makes it clear that the state agency may not regulate additional pollu-
tants from a source for which the EPA has promulgated "an effluent
... or pretreatment standard pursuant to section 301, 306 or 307 of
the federal Water Pollution Control Act."1"0
North Dakota's statute similarly provides clear language prohibit-
ing the state agency from regulating "additional pollutants," absent a
written finding following public comment and a hearing.10' The stat-
ute's initial language generally prohibits adoption of rules "more
stringent than corresponding federal regulations addressing the same
circumstances." 0 2 The statute adds, however, that "[t]he department
may adopt rules more stringent than corresponding federal regula-
tions or adopt rules where there are no corresponding federal regula-
tions," only after making a written finding following public comment
and a hearing.'0 3 Because there would be no corresponding federal
regulations for a state regulation addressing additional pollutants, the
statute clearly precludes regulation of additional pollutants without a
written finding following public comment and a hearing.
Other states also have statutes designed to constrain state agency
authority that contain language fairly clearly indicating that the state
agency lacks authority to regulate additional pollutants. For example,
state regulation controlling a pollutant that Congress or EPA specifically has refrained
from regulating would be more stringent than federal law. In this context, Atlantic States
Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
62 (1994), is instructive. Atlantic States Legal Foundation commenced a citizens' suit
against Eastman Kodak claiming that the company was violating the Clean Water Act "by
discharging large quantities of pollutants not listed in its SPDES [State Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System] permit." Id. at 355. Atlantic States argued that Kodak's "permit...
and section 301 of the CWA, 42 U.S.C. § 1311, prohibit absolutely the discharge of any
pollutant not specifically authorized under Kodak's SPDES permit." Id. at 356. The Sec-
ond Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the Clean Water Act's regulatory scheme
is directed toward identifying and limiting "the most harmful pollutants while leaving the
control of the vast number of other pollutants to disclosure requirements." Id. at 357.
"[P]olluters may discharge pollutants not specifically listed in their permits so long as they
comply with the appropriate reporting requirements and abide by any new limitations
when imposed on such pollutants." Id. Because the Atlantic States court held that the
Clean Water Act allows the discharge of pollutants for which a permit contains no limita-
tion, the decision suggests that any state regulation resulting in permit limitations on pollu-
tants for which the Clean Water Act requires no permit limitation inherently would be
more stringent than the Clean Water Act.
100. IOWA CODE ANN., § 455B.173.2 (West Supp. 1994).
101. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-10-04.1 (1993).
102. Id. § 23-01-04.1.1.
103. Id. § 23-01-04.1.2.
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Pennsylvania's statute "incorporate[s] by reference into the depart-
ment's permitting program" the "regulations establishing perform-
ance or emission standards promulgated under section 112 of the
Clean Air Act."'1 4 The statute further prohibits the promulgation of
"a more stringent performance or emission standard for hazardous air
pollutant emissions from existing sources" without specific findings
that more stringent standards are necessary.'05 This language fairly
clearly prohibits the setting of standards for additional pollutants
from existing sources absent the required finding of necessity. Rhode
Island's statute, by providing that regulations relating to the "specific
control technology and emission characteristics of fuels shall not be
more stringent than the mandatory standards established by federal
law or regulation," similarly appears to constrain the state agency's
authority to promulgate regulation of "additional pollutants" from fu-
els, absent a finding that such regulations are necessary to assure com-
pliance with the ambient standards. Such an additional finding would
be necessary because such regulations would go beyond the
"mandatory standards established by federal law or regulation. "106
The Kentucky statute likewise appears to prohibit state agencies
from regulating additional pollutants. The statute, which gives state
agencies authority to promulgate regulations when "required by fed-
eral law," further limits the state agencies' authority in such circum-
stances by providing that any resulting regulations "shall be no more
stringent than the federal law or regulations."' °7 Because in this con-
text the state agencies have authority to promulgate regulations only
to the extent that federal law requires, the statute appears to constrain
the state agencies from regulating beyond federal law, as such regula-
tions could not be "required by federal law." s08 Kentucky has a spe-
104. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4006.6(a) (1993).
105. Id. § 4006.6(a), (d)(1).
106. R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-23-5(12) (Supp. 1994).
107. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13A.120(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1993).
108. Id. The only decision interpreting § 13A.120(1) is Franklin v. Natural Resources
and Envtl. Protection Cabinet, 799 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1990), in which four mining companies
contested a regulation of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet
(NREPC). Id. at 2. The regulation provided for an informal hearing following a "Notice of
Non-Compliance and Order for Remedial Measures." Id. If the informal hearing resulted
in fines or penalties, the sole remedy was a request for a formal hearing within 30 days,
which "must be accompanied by a payment into escrow of all sums assessed for the non-
compliance." Id. The companies challenged the regulation on the grounds that, inter alia,
it violated § 13A.120(1). Id. at 3.
In addressing the challenge, the court looked to the hearing procedure provided by
the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. That Act states that an
accused strip miner "is provided a formal hearing, with a full record, rights of examination,
cross-examination, subpoenas, etc.," from which "there is an appeal to an Administrative
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cific statute addressing one aspect of air pollution that similarly
precludes regulation of additional pollutants."0 9 This statute directs
the cabinet to "preserve existing clean air resources while ensuring
economic growth by issuing regulations, which shall be no more strin-
gent than federal requirements." 1 0 Because federal requirements re-
lating to the prevention of significant deterioration, a discrete
program within the Clean Air Act, address only a handful of pollu-
tants, section 224.10-100(26) appears to impose a constraint on
agency authority to regulate additional pollutants, a specific con-
straint which is consistent with the general constraint on administra-
tive agency authority in section 13A.120(1).
With respect to the regulation of underground storage tanks, Ar-
kansas1 ' and New Mexico' 12 have statutes that appear to limit their
respective state agencies from imposing additional regulations on fed-
erally regulated sources. Arkansas's statute provides that any regula-
tions of underground storage tanks, as much as possible, shall "be
identical to and no more stringent than the federal regulations
adopted by the United States Environmental Protection Agency."
'113
New Mexico's statute likewise limits the state agency's authority to pro-
mulgate regulations "concerning underground storage tanks.., that
are equivalent to and no more stringent than federal regulations
adopted by the federal environmental protection agency pursuant to
the federal Resource Conservation Recovery Act of 1976, as
amended."" 4 Because these statutes require that state regulations be
"identical to" or "equivalent to" federal regulations, they suggest that
the state agencies lack authority to promulgate "additional regula-
tions" related to federally regulated sources, given that such "addi-
tional regulations" would not be "identical to" or "equivalent to" the
federal regulations.
Law Judge and ultimately to the federal court system." Id. In finding that the regulation
violated § 13A.120(1), the court specifically noted that "[b]y not providing a similar pro-
ceeding, the Kentucky regulations are more stringent than the federal law and regula-
tions." Id. Although the case focused on a regulation that provided less complete
procedural protection than the federal statute, its holding supports the conclusion that
under § 13A.120(1), the Cabinet lacks the authority to impose regulations regarding addi-
tional pollutants for which the federal law requires no regulation.
109. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.10-100(26) (Baldwin Supp. 1994).
110. Id.
111. Aitx CODE ANN. § 8-7-803 (Michie 1993).
112. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-4-4C (Michie 1993).
113. AR. CODE ANN. § 8-7-803.
114. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-4-4C.
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2. Statutes That Clearly Allow an Agency to Regulate Additional Pollu-
tants from Regulated Sources. -Oklahoma appears to have the only stat-
ute that clearly allows regulation of "additional pollutants," at least in
the context of hazardous air pollutants. The statute initially provides
that "to assure that [the state] program shall be consistent with, and
not more stringent than, federal requirements," any rule "regarding
hazardous air pollutants and regulated substances shall only be
[promulgated] by adoption by reference of final federal rules," unless
there is a determination that "more stringent standards are necessary
to protect the public health."" 5 The statute further provides specific
authority, however, for establishing a program "for the control of the
emission of those toxic air contaminants not otherwise regulated by a
final emission standard under section 112(d) of the Federal Clean Air
Act."
1 16
3. Statutes Containing Ambiguous Language Regarding the Extent of
the Agency's Authority to Regulate Additional Pollutants from Regulated
Sources.-Most statutory constraints on state agency authority lack any
clear statement of the extent of the state agency's authority to regulate
additional pollutants. Indeed, the extent to which a statutory con-
straint precludes regulation of additional pollutants frequently re-
mains as ambiguous after judicial interpretation as it was before.
a. F/orida.-For example, section 403.804 of the Florida
Statutes requires performance of a cost-benefit analysis of "any pro-
posed standard that would be stricter or more stringent than one
which has been set by federal agencies pursuant to federal law or regu-
lation." 1 7 The statute, however, contains no language stating
whether regulation of "additional pollutants" from a federally regu-
lated source would trigger the obligation to perform the cost-benefit
analysis. 118
In Florida Electric Power Coordinating Group, Inc. v. Askew," 9 how-
ever, the Florida District Court of Appeal was asked to interpret sec-
tion 403.804. The electric power companies of Florida asked the
court whether (1) "a state standard approved by the federal Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) can be more stringent than a federal
standard," and (2) "a state standard which limits the same pollutant
115. Omi-k. STAT. ANN. tit. 27A, § 2-5-114 (West Supp. 1995).
116. Id.
117. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.804 (West 1993).
118. Id.
119. 366 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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from the same source as a federal standard, but by a different method,
can be compared to determine which is more stringent."120
The court noted that "for a Florida standard to be 'a stricter or
more stringent standard than one which has been set by federal agen-
cies pursuant to federal law or regulations,' the federal standard must be
in counterpoise to the state standard."1 21 Applying this rule to the first
issue the electric power companies had raised, the court discussed
how ambient water quality standards, which the state adopts and EPA
approves, compare with technology-based effluent limitations that the
EPA alone sets."' Acknowledging that a discharger "may be required
to achieve a greater reduction in effluent than the federal [technol-
ogy-based effluent limitations] require if the prevailing water quality
standards so require," the court nonetheless concluded that the state
water quality standards had no federal counterpart against which to
be compared to determine whether the Florida standards were
stricter. 123 By comparison, the court noted that under the Clean Air
Act, EPA has set national primary and secondary ambient air quality
standards that provide a basis for comparison with state ambient air
quality standards.1 2
4
The court then applied this rule to the second issue the electric
power companies had raised, namely the extent to which standards
containing different methods to address the same pollutant from the
same source are comparable to determine which is stricter. 121 Using
thermal pollution as an example, the court noted that EPA requires
installation of a specific type of water cooling system at new power
plants, whereas the state regulation simply prohibits the discharge of
"heated water having a temperature at the point of discharge more
than five degrees Fahrenheit higher than the natural temperature of
[a receiving] stream."12 6 The court concluded that when state and
federal standards regulate a pollutant by different methods, the court
cannot find as a matter of law that Florida standards are stricter than
federal standards. 127
120. Id. at 1188.
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. The court noted that the Commission did direct the Department to review
certain ambient air quality standards, some of which were indeed more stringent than their
federal counterparts, requiring a study of the costs and benefits of such standards. Id.
125. Id. at 1188-89.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1189.
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The court's conclusion that the statute applies only when there is
"a federal standard in counterpoise to the state standard,"1 28 however,
merely begs the question. If a federal agency has set a standard for a
source, but has not set a standard with respect to the pollutant in
question, is the federal standard "in counterpoise to the state stan-
dard"? To ascertain whether the statute applies, the court would have
to determine the breadth of the definition of a "standard." Does
"standard" denote a set of regulations relating to emissions from a
source generally, or to each individual pollutant-specific regulation
for each such source? The definition of "standard" in section
403.803(13) of the Florida Statutes provides no answer. 129 Because
the language of both section 403.804 and the Florida Electric Power deci-
sion are vague, neither helps resolve this issue. 130
128. Id. at 1188.
129. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.803(13) (West Supp. 1995). Section 403.803(13) states:
"'Standard' means any rule of the Department of Environmental Protection relating to air
and water quality, noise, solid-waste management, and electric and magnetic fields associ-
ated with electrical transmission and distribution lines and substation facilities." Id.
130. South Dakota's statute differs from Florida's in that it provides that the state agency
may not promulgate rules "more stringent than any corresponding federal law, rule, or
regulation governing an essentially similar subject or issue." S.D. CODIFIED LAwS ANN. § 1-
40-4.1 (1992). The South Dakota statute, however, presents an interpretive problem simi-
lar to the "counterpoise" problem in the Florida statute. The interpretive problem arises
because it is unclear whether the reference to an "essentially similar subject or issue," § 1-
40-4.1, concerns a regulation of a specific source or the regulation of a specific pollutant.
Oklahoma's recently enacted statute, which is a cross between the Florida and South
Dakota language in that it requires a determination of economic impact with respect to
.any rule more stringent than corresponding federal requirements," similarly presents the
same problem as Florida's statute: Does the reference to "corresponding federal require-
ments" focus on regulation of a specific source or regulation of a specific pollutant. Nota-
bly, however, because the statute does not apply when "such stringency is specifically
authorized by state statute," it would appear that no economic impact analysis would be
required with respect to a program addressing toxic air contaminants as discussed supra at
note 117 and accompanying text.
The Utah statutes, likewise, contain ambiguous language that presents a problem simi-
lar to the Florida, South Dakota, and Oklahoma statutes. The Utah statute prohibits the
state agency from promulgating rules "more stringent than corresponding federal regula-
tions which address the same circumstances," when the state agencies are promulgating
rules "for the purpose of the state administering a program under" one of the federal
environmental statutes. UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-2-106(1), (2) (Supp. 1994) (concerning air
pollution); id. § 19-4-105(1), (2) (concerning safe drinking water); id. § 19-5-105(1), (2)
(concerning water pollution); id. § 19-6-106(1), (2) (concerning state administration of
RCRA, CERCLA, and the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act); id.
§ 40-10-6.5 (concerning surface coal mining and reclamation). The question arises
whether the reference to "corresponding federal regulations which address the same cir-
cumstances" concerns a regulation of a specific source or the regulation of a specific pollu-
tant. The question also arises whether the language 'for the purpose of the state
administering a program under" one of the federal statutes implies that the state agency
retains authority to regulate additional pollutants not covered by a federal statute, because
regulation of such pollutants would not be "for the purpose of the state administering" the
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b. Missouri.-The Missouri statutes' contain no clear lan-
guage indicating how much they limit the Air Conservation Commis-
sion's (Air Commission) authority to regulate additional pollutants.
Section 643.050 of the Missouri Statutes gives the Air Commission
broad powers to regulate air pollution "consistent with the general
intent and purposes of sections 643.010 to 643.190 . . .and Titles V
and VI of the federal Clean Air Act, as amended."' 32  Section
643.055.1 also authorizes the Air Commission "to promulgate rules
and regulations . . .to insure that the state of Missouri is in compli-
ance with the provisions of the federal Clean Air Act," but does not
allow the Air Commission to promulgate any standards or guidelines
"stricter than those required under the provisions of the federal Clean
Air Act, as amended."' 3 3
On the one hand, the broad delegation of authority in section
643.050.1 suggests that the Air Commission has authority to regulate
additional pollutants. On the other hand, the regulation of pollutants
not regulated in the Clean Air Act arguably cannot be "required
under the provisions of the federal Clean Air Act, as amended"; 34
therefore, section 643.055.1 appears to limit the Air Commission's
regulatory authority.to those pollutants regulated in the Clean Air Act.
Does the limitation in section 643.055.1 extend to regulations promul-
gated under section 643.050.1 that are not necessary "to insure that
the state of Missouri is in compliance" with the Clean Air Act?
The Missouri Court of Appeals addressed these questions in Mis-
souri Hospital Ass'n v. Air Conservation Commission."' In that case, the
Missouri Hospital Association and Associated Industries of Missouri
(AIM) [hereinafter Plaintiffs] sought to enjoin the Air Commission
and the Missouri Department of Natural Resources [hereinafter
State] from enforcing regulations affecting incinerators for burning
federal statute. The additional language in the Utah statutes makes them no less ambigu-
ous than the Florida, South Dakota, and Oklahoma statutes.
In the context of water pollution, Colorado's statute also presents a problem similar to
the "counterpoise" problem evident in the F/orida E/ectiic Power court's interpretation of the
Florida statute. Colorado's statute provides that the state agency "may adopt rules more
stringent than corresponding enforceable federal requirements" only if there is a finding,
"based on sound scientific or technical evidence in the record" that more stringent rules
"are necessary to protect the public health." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-8-202(8) (West
1990).
131. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 643.050.1(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
132. Id.
133. Id. § 643.055.1. As mentioned supra note 42 and accompanying text, however, the
restrictions in § 643.055.1 do not apply when stricter regulations are needed to obtain EPA
approval of the State Implementation Plan.
134. Id.
135. 874 S.W.2d 380 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
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medical waste, solid waste, industrial waste, and sewage sludge.13 6 The
Plaintiffs claimed that the Air Commission exceeded its authority in
promulgating the regulations because the regulations were more
stringent than and took effect sooner than federal law required, con-
trary to the dictates of section 643.055 of the Missouri Statutes. 137 The
Circuit Court for Cole County granted the Plaintiffs' motion for sum-
mary judgment, holding that in promulgating the challenged rules
the Air Commission exceeded section 643.055's limitation on the Air
Commission's authority.
The State appealed,1 38 arguing that section 643.055.1 constituted
an independent grant of authority to the Air Commission, and that
this grant was intended to supplement the general enabling language
in section 643.050.1, in order to assure that the Air Commission had
authority "to promulgate rules... to ensure compliance with the fed-
eral Clean Air Act." ' 9 Accordingly, the State contended that the limi-
136. Id. at 385. The Association challenged the medical waste and solid waste incinera-
tor rules, Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 10-6.160 (1991), while AIM challenged the industrial
waste and sewage sludge incinerator rules, id. § 10-6.190 (1991). First Amended Petition
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Missouri Hosp. Ass'n v. Air Conservation Comm'n
(Cole County Cir. Ct.) (No. CV 191-1098CC) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Petition]. Both rules
regulated incinerator design, operational controls, emissions limitations for specific air
pollutants, operator training, performance testing methods, exemptions, and compliance
schedules. Both rules also provided for compliance schedules for existing incinerators and
require new incinerators to comply with the regulations upon start-up. Mo. CODE REGS. tit.
10, §§ 10-6.160, -6.190.
137. Plaintiffs Petition at 3-5. The plaintiffs also asserted that the rules were void be-
cause the Air Commission had not promulgated the rules in accordance with §§ 536.200
and 536.205 of the Missouri Statutes. Id. Sections 536.200 and 536.205 provide that when
a Missouri agency proposes a rule that will require or cause an expenditure of public funds
for any agency or political subdivision, the agency must file a fiscal note with the Secretary
of State. The note must be published in the Missouri Register contemporaneously with
and adjacent to the notice of proposed rule-making, and must estimate the compliance
cost for each affected agency or each affected political subdivision. Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 536.200, .205 (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1994). Although both the circuit court and the
court of appeals agreed with the plaintiffs on this point, Missouri Hosp. Ass'n, 874 S.W.2d at
385-89, the court of appeals addressed the interpretation of § 643.055, "[b]ecause of its
importance to the public, the State and the regulated community." Id. at 392.
138. Id. at 385.
139. Id. at 394. Section 643.050.1 provides that,
[i]n addition to any other powers vested in it by law, the Air Commission shall
have the following powers: (1) to adopt, promulgate, amend, and repeal rules
and regulations consistent with the general intent and purposes of sections
643.010 to 643.190, chapter 536 RSMo, and Titles V and VI of the federal Clean
Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 7661 et seq., including but not limited to: (a)
regulation of use of equipment known to be a source of air contamination; (b)
establishment of maximum quantities of air contaminants that may be emitted
from any air contaminant source; and (c) regulations necessary to enforce provi-
sions of Title VI of the Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 7671, et seq.,
regarding any Class I or Class II substances as defined therein.
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tation on the Air Commission's authority in the second sentence of
section 643.055.1 applied only "to rules made pursuant to the ex-
panded power to make rules."1 4
0
The court of appeals began its analysis by comparing the lan-
guage of section 643.050.1 with the language of 643.055.1 and setting
out the operative standards for statutory construction. 14' The court
first noted that it should construe statutes relating to the same subject
as though they constituted one act, with any conflict between a gen-
eral statute and a more specific one on the same subject to be resolved
in favor of the more specific statute, which is read to qualify the more
general statute. 142 Applying these principles of statutory construction,
the court rejected the State's argument that the more specific lan-
guage in section 643.055.1 supplemented the general enabling lan-
guage of section 643.050.1.' 4 The court found that because section
643.050.1 gave the Commission all the rule-making authority neces-
sary to ensure Missouri's compliance with the Clean Air Act, section
643.055.1 was not a grant of additional authority.44 Instead, the court
viewed section 643.050 as a direction to the Air Commission to ensure
Missouri's compliance with the Clean Air Act without adopting rules
stricter than that Act required. 45
Having concluded that section 643.055.1 generally limited the Air
Commission's authority, the court then considered whether the chal-
lenged rules exceeded the Air Commission's authority- whether the
challenged regulations were stricter than federal law required, or took
effect earlier than federal law required."4 The court interpreted the
limitation in section 643.055.1 to operate as follows: "[I]f Congress
has spoken on a particular issue in the federal Clean Air Act, the Com-
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 643.050.1 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
The first sentence of § 643.055.1 provides the Air Commission with the authority "to
establish standards and guidelines to insure that the state of Missouri is in compliance with
the provisions of the federal 'Clean Air Act,' as amended." Id. § 643.055.1.
140. Missouri Hosp. Assn, 874 S.W.2d at 396. The second sentence of § 643.055.1 of the
Missouri Statutes prohibits the Commission from promulgating any standards or guide-
lines "stricter than those required under the provisions of the federal Clean Air Act, as
amended" and also prohibits the Commission from enforcing any such regulations "prior
to the time required by the federal Clean Air Act, as amended." Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 643.055.1 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
141. Missouri Hosp. Ass'n, 874 S.W.2d at 392-94.
142. Id. at 394.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 395.
145. Id. at 396. The court noted that "the General Assembly has chosen to allow federal
law to preempt the Commission's rulemaking authority as to areas covered by the Clean
Air Act." Id.
146. Id.
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mission is prohibited from adopting rules or regulations on that issue
that are either stricter than federal law or enforceable sooner."147
The court noted that in section 129 of the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990,148 Congress "required the EPA to promulgate standards for
certain classes and sizes" of municipal and infectious waste incinera-
tors by specific deadlines. 49 Based on this directive, the court con-
cluded that the challenged rules violated section 643.055.1 in two
respects:
[First, because] Congress has directed EPA to adopt rules es-
tablishing standards for such units, and further specified
dates as to when there must be compliance with such rules
... any rule adopted by the [Air] Commission at this time
will be stricter than federal requirements because no federal
standards currently exist. Furthermore, the compliance
dates established by the [Air] Commission in [the chal-
lenged rules] are, in some instances, earlier than those re-
quired by Congress to be used by EPA in its rules and,
therefore, would require compliance sooner than mandated
by federal law.'
Accordingly, the court struck down the challenged rules because the
Air Commission acted outside its authority under section 643.055.1 in
promulgating them. 5
147. Id.
148. Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 129, 104 Stat. 2399, 2578 (1990).
149. Missouri Hasp. Ass'n, 874 S.W.2d at 396-97 n.24. The court noted that the 1990
Amendments to the Clean Air Act directed EPA "to establish federal standards by Novem-
ber 15, 1992 for incinerators burning hospital, medical or infectious waste and municipal
waste incinerators with a capacity less than or equal to 250 tons per day." Id. The court
further noted, however, that EPA
failed to meet that deadline and has yet to promulgate rules for such incinerating
units. Indeed, EPA has not even announced rule proposal and promulgation
dates for large and small municipal waste incinerators (Municipal Waste Combus-
tion, 58 Fed. Reg. 25,060 (1993)), and now projects rule proposal for infectious,
hospital and medical waste incinerators in March, 1994 with final action in Au-
gust, 1995 (Medical Waste Incinerators, 58 Fed. Reg. 25,059 (1993)).
Id. The court also noted that "[tlhe 1990 Amendments did not require standards to be
proposed for units combusting 'commercial or industrial waste' until November 15, 1993,
with promulgation required by November 15, 1994. Id.
One of the main reasons that the state wanted to enforce the proposed regulations
was to fill the gap created by EPA's failure to promulgate regulations in a timely manner.
Brief of Appellants Missouri Air Conservation Commission and Missouri Department of
Natural Resources, Missouri Hosp. Ass'n v. Air Conservation Comm'n, 874 S.W.2d 380
(Mo. CL App. 1994) (No. WD 47706).
150. Missouri Hosp. Ass'n, 874 S.W.2d at 396-97.
151. Id. at 397.
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The court rejected the State's argument that this interpretation
of section 643.055.1 would nullify "all the [Air] Commission's rules
which are not duplicative of federal standards." 5 ' The court stated,
in dicta, "[t]he [Air] Commission continues to have rulemaking au-
thority to regulate Missouri air quality in all ways, and in all areas, not
covered by the federal Clean Air Act."' The court noted that
although the General Assembly had "decided to limit the [Air] Com-
mission's authority by permitting federal law to preempt on subjects
where Congress has spoken,"'54 the General Assembly still retained
the authority to regulate air quality in the state more stringently than
federal law requires.155
The court's opinion, unfortunately, provides little concrete gui-
dance and presents a problem similar to the "counterpoise" problem
in the Florida court's interpretation of the Florida statute.1 56
Whether section 643.055.1 constrains the Air Commission's authority
to regulate "additional pollutants" depends on the court's intention in
holding that the Air Commission has no authority when Congress "has
spoken on a particular issue." 5 7 Did the court mean that when Con-
gress has decided to regulate a source, the Air Commission no longer
has authority to regulate that source any differently? Alternatively, did
the court mean that to the extent Congress has regulated specific pol-
lutants from a source, the Air Commission may not regulate differ-
ently with respect to those particular pollutants, but may regulate
"additional pollutants" that Congress did not?' 58
In addition, what did the court mean when it said that the Air
Commission "continues to have rulemaking authority ... in all ways,
152. Id. The State's argument implicitly presumed that, under the court's decision, the
Air Commission would have lacked the authority under § 643.050.1 to regulate pollutants
or sources the Clean Air Act did not cover because such regulations would violate
§ 643.055.1's dictate that regulations not be "stricter than required under the provisions of
the federal Clean Air Act, as amended." Id.
153. Id. Although the court's statement implies that the word "required" does not have
the restrictive meaning the State implicitly subscribed to it, the court arguably violated one
of the canons of statutory interpretation by not offering an interpretation of the statute
that gives the word "required" any meaning. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 96, § 46.06 (stat-
ing that statutes should be interpreted to give each word meaning and effect).
154. Missouri Hosp. Ass'n, 874 S.W.2d at 397.
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 120-130 and accompanying text.
157. Missouri Hosp. Ass'n, 874 S.W.2d at 396.
158. As noted supra at note 67 and accompanying text, Tennessee recently enacted legis-
lation that raises this same issue by authorizing the Government Operations Committee to
invalidate environmental requirements "on municipalities that are more stringent than
federal statutes or rules on the same subject." 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 878 (S.B. 2040)
(codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-225 (1994)).
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and in all areas, not covered by the federal Clean Air Act"? 59
Although the court's opinion is not particularly instructive, the court's
focus on the need to protect the regulated community from multiple
sets of regulations"6 suggests that it would interpret the Missouri stat-
ute restrictively, such that when Congress has regulated a source in
any way, it has "spoken on a particular issue,"161 thereby foreclosing
the Air Commission from regulating emissions of additional pollu-
tants from such a source.
c. New Mexico. -Although section 74-2-5 of the New Mexico
statute contains more specific language than either the Florida or the
Missouri statutes, it likewise presents a variation of the Florida "coun-
terpoise" problem 16 2 or the Missouri "spoken on a particular issue"
problem.16 Section 74-2-5 prohibits state regulations more stringent
than "required by federal standards of performance," with respect to
regulations that:
(1) protect visibility in mandatory class 1 areas;
(2) prevent significant deterioration of air quality;
(3) achieve national ambient air quality standards in nonat-
tainment areas;
(4) prescribe standards of performance for emission
sources;
(5) prescribe emission standards for hazardous air pollu-
tants; and
(6) concern permits for the construction or modification of
any air emission source. 16
4
One could read the language of section 74-2-5 as suggesting that once
the federal government has established a "standard of performance"
for any source, the New Mexico Air Quality Control Board
(NMAQCB) may promulgate only a coextensive "standard of perform-
ance" that addresses only the pollutants covered by the federal stan-
dard and imposes limitations the same as the federal limitations. 65
A 1987 opinion by the New Mexico Attorney General, however,
suggests that things may not be so clear. According to the Attorney
General, for those areas that the New Mexico Air Quality Control Act
159. Missouri Hosp. Ass'n, 874 S.W.2d at 396.
160. Id. See supra note 73 for the court's interpretation of the Missouri General Assem-
bly's intent in enacting § 643.055.1.
161. Missouri Hosp. Ass'n, 874 S.W.2d at 396.
162. See supra notes 120-130 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 131-161 and accompanying text.
164. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-5 (Michie 1993).
165. Id. § 74-2-5C(3).
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does not preclude, the NMAQCB may "promulgate standards and reg-
ulations that are more stringent than the federal standards and regu-
lations and can promulgate standards and regulations for which there
is no equivalent federal standard or regulation."" 6 The language of
the Attorney General's opinion raises a problem similar to the "coun-
terpoise" '6 7 and "spoken on a particular issue""6 problems discussed
above. When referring to an "equivalent federal standard or regula-
tion," did the Attorney General mean a set of regulations relating to
emissions from a source generally, or to each individual pollutant-spe-
cific regulation established for such a source? In addition, what did
the Attorney General mean when referring to areas "not specifically
precluded" '69 in the New Mexico Air Quality Control Act? In contrast
with the Missouri Hospital Ass'n opinion, 17 0 which contained some lan-
guage allowing an inference that the Air Commission lacked authority
to regulate additional pollutants, the language in the New Mexico At-
torney General's opinion suggests that the statute does not limit the
NMAQCB's authority to regulate additional pollutants. By citing sev-
eral examples of allegedly valid state regulations relating to additional
pollutants, including "standards for hydrogen sulfide, heavy metals,
and total hydrocarbons for which no federal standards exist," the
opinion implies that the statute does not specifically preclude the
NMAQCB's regulation of such additional pollutants. 71
166. 87 Op. N.M. Att'y Gen. No. 11, at 3 (1987). After the legislature amended § 74-2-5
to provide specifically that the Board should adopt regulations that are no more stringent
than, but at least as stringent as, the federal requirements, the Attorney General was asked
specifically to opine on the extent to which New Mexico's Air Quality Control Act was
more stringent than the federal Clean Air Act.
167. See supra notes 120-130 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretive prob-
lem in Florida Elec. Power Coordinating Group, Inc. v. Askew, 366 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978).
168. See supra notes 131-161 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretive prob-
lem in Missouri Hosp. Ass'n v. Air Conservation Comm'n, 874 S.W.2d 380 (Mo. CL App.
1994).
169. 87 Op. N.M. Att'y Gen. at 3.
170. 874 S.W.2d 380 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); see supra notes 136-153 and accompanying
text.
171. Missouri Hosp. Ass'n, 874 S.W.2d at 380. Much like the Missouri Court of Appeals
construction of the Missouri statute in Missouri Hospital Ass'n, the New Mexico Attorney
General's opinion failed to give meaning to the word "required" in § 74-2-5. See supra note
153.
Colorado, Ohio, and Arkansas all have statutes containing language that presents
problems similar to those in Missouri and New Mexico. Section 25-7-114.2 of Colorado's
air pollution statute constrains the state agency from imposing regulations regarding indi-
rect air pollution sources that are "more stringent than those required for compliance with
the federal act and final rules and regulations adopted pursuant thereto." COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 25-7-114.2 (West Supp. 1994). Ohio's recent legislation authorizes the adop-
tion of rules provided that they "are consistent with, and no more stringent than, the re-
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d. West Virginia.-The recently enacted West Virginia stat-
utes present the same type of "counterpoise" problem. Section 22-1-
3a gives the Director of the Division of Environmental Protection
(DEP) the authority to promulgate rules with "environmental provi-
sions which are more stringent than the counterpart federal rule or
program" provided that the director sets forth the specific reasons. 172
The statute further provides, however, that "[i] n the absence of a fed-
eral rule, the adoption of a state rule shall not be construed to be
more stringent than a federal rule unless the absence of a federal rule
is the result of a specific federal exemption."173 Does the statute's
reference to a "counterpart federal rule" mean any rule applicable to
a source or any rule applicable to a specific pollutant from such
source? Section 22-5-4 presents similar ambiguities as it provides that
no rule or program related to air pollution "shall be any more strin-
gent than any federal rule or program except to the limited extent
that the director [of the DEP] first makes a.specific written finding for
any such departure."
174
e. Underground Storage Tanks.-Several state statutes relating
to underground storage tanks similarly fail to indicate clearly whether
the state environmental agency lacks the authority to impose addi-
tional regulations beyond federal requirements. Section 46.03.365(c)
quirements of Tide V of the federal Clean Air Act." 1993 Ohio Laws File 62, § I (S.B. 153)
(codified at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3704.036 (Anderson 1994)). Section 8-4-207(1) (A) of
the Arkansas Code, which relates to water pollution control, authorizes conditions in per-
mits to assure the achievement of effluent limitations based upon applying levels of treat-
ment technology and processes "as are required under the federal act or any more
stringent effluent limitations necessary to meet water quality criteria or toxic standards
established pursuant to any state or federal law or regulation." AR& CODE ANN. § 8-4-
207(1)(A) (Michie Supp. 1989). The use of the word "required" or "requirements" in
each of these statutes suggests that the state agency is not authorized to regulate additional
pollutants, because the regulation of pollutants not covered by the Clean Air Act or Clean
Water Act arguably cannot be "required for compliance with the federal act," or be "re-
quired under the federal act." Because the Missouri court and the New Mexico Attorney
General failed to give meaning to the word "required" in their respective state statutes, the
existence in a statutory constraint of the phrase "no more stringent than required" under
federal law may not clarify an otherwise ambiguous statute.
172. W. VA. CODE § 22-1-3a (1994).
173. Id.
174. Id. § 22-5-4. Interestingly, a previous version of § 22-5-4, § 16-2-5(4), which was re-
pealed by 1994 W. Va. Acts 61, in which § 22-5-4 was enacted, arguably contained language
making it fairly clear that any regulation of additional pollutants from a source regulated
under federal law would constitute "more stringent" regulation requiring a specific written
finding explaining the reasons for the more stringent regulation. See 58 Op. W. Va. Att'y
Gen. 127, 135 (1979) (concluding that § 16-20-5(4) applied "when the federal government
has a rule, regulation, program, plan or standard for the same sources" regulated under a
given rule).
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of the Alaska Statutes provides that when state underground storage
tank regulations "address areas governed by federal laws or regula-
tions, the state regulations must be consistent with federal laws and
regulations and may not be more stringent than the federal laws and
regulations.""'5 This presents a variation on the "counterpoise" issue
presented by the court's discussion of the Florida statute in Florida
Electric Power.176 Does "areas" refer to specific categories of sources, or
to specific pollutants or obligations applicable to a given source?
Sections 49-1003, -1006, and -1009 of the Arizona statutes likewise
simply provide that underground storage tank rules "shall be consis-
tent with and no more stringent than the federal regulations in effect
on the date on which the rules are adopted. " 177 The language does
not indicate whether additional regulations applicable to a source are
"consistent with" federal regulations applicable to that source. Several
other states also have statutes containing similar language prohibiting
promulgation of underground storage tank regulations that are more
stringent than federal law, without providing any indication of the
state agency's authority to promulgate additional regulations. 17
175. ALAsKA STAT. § 46.03.365(c) (1994).
176. See supra notes 120-130 and accompanying text.
177. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-1003, -1006, -1009 (Supp. 1994).
178. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-35-10 (Supp. 1994) (providing that rules and regulations
pertaining to underground storage tanks may not be more stringent than those provided
by federal rules or regulations); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.474.1, 3.D., 7 (West 1990) (pro-
viding that rules adopted shall be "consistent with" the requirements of federal regulations
once federal regulations are adopted); NEv. Rv. STAT. § 459.824 (1991) (providing for
administration of the provisions relating to storage tanks "in a manner that is consistent
with, and not more stringent than, the applicable provisions of federal law"); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 249:17 (1993) (providing that rules relating to financial responsibility for
underground storage tanks adopted pursuant to § 149-C:9 "shall not be more stringent
than the federal rules"); N.D. CENr. CODE § 23-20.3-04.1 (1991) (providing that regula-
tions relating to underground storage tanks "may not be more stringent than applicable
federal rules" adopted pursuant to RCRA); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 307 (West Supp.
1995) (requiring that for any standard different from a federal standard on the same sub-
ject the agency shall "clearly express the deviation from the federal standard... and the
reasons for the deviation"); OR. Rav. STAT. § 466.746 (1992) (providing that performance
standards shall be consistent with federal standards and that soil assessment and tank tight-
ness requirements "shall not be more stringent than" federal requirements, absent a find-
ing that more stringent standards are necessary); TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.357(b)
(West 1988) (providing that standards and rules "may not [be] ... more stringent than the
federal requirements" unless there is a determination that more stringent standards are
necessary); W. VA. CODE § 22-17-6 (1994) (providing that rules "shall be no more stringent
than the rules and regulations promulgated under Subtitle I"); Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-
1416(a) (i) (1994) (providing that rules and regulations shall "[p]rovide for performance,
operating and installation standards for underground storage tanks which shall be no less
or no more stringent than the federal standards").
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B. Impact on Regulation of Sources Not Regulated Under Federal Law
Assume that a state legislature passes a statute directing the state
environmental agency to promulgate regulations concerning air pol-
lution, provided that the agency may not promulgate any rules more
stringent than federal law. Next assume that the state environmental
agency proposes regulations that would apply not only to the catego-
ries of sources covered by the Clean Air Act, but also to categories it
does not cover. Under these circumstances, would the state environ-
mental agency be acting beyond its authority by attempting to impose
a standard more stringent than federal law?
To answer this question, one must answer the following ques-
tions: When state legislation prohibits a state environmental agency
from promulgating standards more stringent than federal law, what
does the state legislature mean? Is the state legislature agreeing with
the federal decision to regulate only certain sources, such that the
state environmental agency may not promulgate any regulations of
sources that federal environmental law leaves unregulated? Alterna-
tively, is the state legislature simply agreeing with the manner in which
federal environmental law regulates certain sources, such that the
state environmental agency may promulgate standards for sources
that federal environmental legislation ignores?
1. Statutes That Fairly Clearly Allow an Agency to Regulate Additional
Sources.--Several states have adopted statutes that allow state regula-
tion of additional sources. For example, Pennsylvania's statute regu-
lating hazardous air pollutants, which provides for the establishment
of "performance or emission standards for sources or categories of
sources which are not included on the list of source categories estab-
lished under section 112(c) of the Clean Air Act," clearly authorizes
the regulation of additional sources. 79 Other states also have statutes
that appear to enable their respective state agencies to regulate addi-
tional sources, because the statutes' language limits the agencies' au-
thority only when a federal regulation exists for comparison. For
instance, the limitations contained in the most recently enacted
179. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4006.6(a) (1993). Oklahoma's statute regulating hazard-
ous air pollutants also appears to allow for at least some regulation of additional sources.
The statute provides specific authority to establish a program "for the control of the emis-
sion of those toxic air contaminants not otherwise regulated by a final emission standard
under section 112(d) of the Federal Clean Air Act." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27A, § 2-5-114.B
(Supp. 1995). This language appears to provide authority for regulation of additional
sources, at least with respect to toxic contaminants not regulated by § 112(d) of the Clean
Air Act, although it also suggests a lack of authority for regulation of additional sources
with respect to those hazardous air pollutants regulated under the Clean Air Act.
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Oklahoma statute, 8 ° and the South Dakota18 and Utah 182 statutes
apply only when there is a "corresponding federal requirement"
(Oklahoma, South Dakota) or "corresponding rule" (Utah) address-
ing the same, or essentially similar, circumstances.183
Section 22-1-31 of the West Virginia Code similarly provides that
rules may be more stringent than "counterpart federal rules" only if
the Director of the DEP makes specific findings. 8 4 Section 22-1-3a
further clarifies that the Director generally has authority to regulate
sources not regulated under federal law, as it provides that "[i]n the
absence of a federal rule, the adoption of a state rule shall not be
construed to be more stringent than a federal rule, unless the absence
of a federal rule is the result of a specific federal exemption."1 85 Colo-
rado also has a statute that appears to allow for regulation of addi-
tional sources, as it limits the state agency's authority to promulgate
more stringent rules, absent a written finding following public com-
ment and a hearing, only when there are "corresponding enforceable
federal requirements."'8 6 Iowa's statute controlling water quality simi-
larly seems to allow state environmental agencies to regulate addi-
tional sources, as it limits the state agency's authority to promulgate
more stringent standards only to the extent that EPA has promulgated
"an effluent or pretreatment standard pursuant to section 301, 306 or
307 of the federal Water Pollution Control Act."1
8 7
Alaska's statute controlling underground storage tanks constrains
the state agency from promulgating regulations more stringent than
federal law only when the state regulations "address areas governed by
federal laws or regulations. '"18 Similarly, Oklahoma's statute authoriz-
ing the development of financial responsibility requirements with re-
180. 1994 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 96 (H.B. 1919) (West) (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit.
27A, § 1-1-206 (1994)).
181. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-40-4.1 (1993).
182. UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-2-106(l), (2) (concerning air pollution); id. § 19-4-105(0),
(2) (concerning safe drinking water); id. 19-5-105(1), (2) (concerning water pollution); id.
§ 19-6-106(1), (2) (concerning state administration of RCRA, CERCIA and the Emergency
Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986); id. § 40-10-6.5(1), (2) (Supp. 1994)
(concerning surface coal mining and reclamation).
183. Tennessee's recently enacted legislation likewise would appear to allow for regula-
tion of "additional sources," as it authorizes the Government Operations Committee to
invalidate only rules "that are more stringent that federal statutes or rules on the same
subject." 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 878 (S.B. 2040) (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-225
(1994)).
184. W. VA. CODE § 22-1-3a (1994).
185. Id.
186. COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-8-202(8) (1990).
187. IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.173.2 (West 1990).
188. ALAsKA STAT. § 46.03.365(c) (1994).
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spect to underground storage tanks prohibits any regulation "more
stringent than is required by the federal Environmental Protection
Agency"1 89 only with respect to "underground storage tank systems of
equal type, age, and classification."' 90
2. Statutes That Fairly Clearly Prohibit a State Agency from Regulating
Additional Sources.--Several states have adopted statutes that forbid
state regulation of additional sources. North Dakota's statute' 9' pro-
vides fairly clear language forbidding state agency regulation of addi-
tional sources, absent a written finding following public comment and
a hearing. The statute's initial language generally prohibits the state
agency from adopting rules "more stringent than corresponding fed-
eral regulations that address the same circumstances." 192 The statute
further states, however, that "[t] he department may adopt rules more
stringent than corresponding federal regulations or adopt rules where
there are no corresponding federal regulations" 9 ' only after making
a written finding following public comment and a hearing.'94 Be-
cause there would be no corresponding federal regulations for a state
regulation addressing additional sources, the statute implicitly pre-
cludes regulation of additional sources without a written finding fol-
lowing public comment and a hearing.
The Kentucky 95 and Rhode Island' 96 statutes also fairly clearly
preclude state regulation of additional sources, at least with respect to
the specific subject areas addressed by the statutes. Kentucky's statute
gives state agencies authority to promulgate regulations only when
such regulations are "required by federal law," and further limits the
state agencies' authority by providing that state regulations "shall be
no more stringent than the federal law or regulations."' 97 The statute
therefore appears to constrain the state agency from promulgating
regulations for additional sources not regulated under federal law, as
such regulations could not be "required by federal law." 1 8 Rhode Is-
land's statute, which provides that regulations relating to the "specific
control technology and emission characteristics of fuels shall not be
189. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 308 (West Supp. 1995).
190. Id.
191. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-04.1.1 (1991).
192. Id.
193. Id. § 23-01-04.1.2.
194. Id.
195. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13A.120(1) (Baldwin 1988 & Supp. 1994).
196. R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-23-5(12) (Supp. 1994).
197. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13A.120(1) (Baldwin 1988 & Supp. 1994).
198. Id.
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more stringent than the mandatory standards established by federal
law or regulation," 99 also appears to constrain the state agency's au-
thority to promulgate regulations of additional sources of fuel emis-
sions, as the statute prohibits the state agency from regulating beyond
the "mandatory standards" of federal law.
The Arkansas and New Mexico statutes concerning regulation of
underground storage tanks similarly appear to constrain the regula-
tion of additional sources. The Arkansas statute provides that any reg-
ulations of underground storage tanks shall, as much as possible, "be
identical to and no more stringent than the federal regulations
adopted by the United States Environmental Protection Agency."2"0
This language seems to preclude state regulation of additional sources
because such regulation would not be "identical to" federal regula-
tions. New Mexico's statute prohibits the state agency from promul-
gating regulations concerning underground storage tanks unless the
state regulations "are equivalent to and no more stringent than fed-
eral regulations adopted by the federal environmental protection
agency pursuant to the federal Resource Conservation Recovery Act of
1976, as amended."20 ' This language, like that in the Arkansas statute,
appears to preclude regulation of additional sources because such
regulations would not be "equivalent to" federal regulations.
3. Statutes Lacking a Clear Statement of the Extent of the Agency's Au-
thority to Regulate Additional Sources.--Section 403.804 of the Florida
Statutes requires a cost-benefit analysis of "any proposed standard that
would be stricter or more stringent than one which has been set by
federal agencies pursuant to federal law or regulation.""0 2 Just as sec-
tion 403.804 lacks language addressing the regulation of additional
pollutants, 0 ' it also lacks language addressing the regulation of addi-
tional sources. The Florida District Court of Appeals' analysis in For-
ida Electric Power Coordinating Group v. Askeu ° may provide some
insight, however. In that case, the Florida District Court of Appeals
interpreted section 403.804 to apply only when there is a "federal stan-
dard in counterpoise to the state standard."2 5 The court's holding
suggests that the statute does not require a cost-benefit analysis of reg-
199. R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-23-5(12) (Supp. 1994).
200. Aiut CODE ANN. § 8-7-803 (Michie 1991).
201. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-4-4C (Michie 1993).
202. FLA.- STAT. ANN. § 403.804 (West 1993).
203. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
204. 366 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); see supra notes 120-130 and accompany-
ing text.
205. orida Elec. Power, 366 So. 2d at 1188.
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ulations for sources that federal environmental regulations do not
address.
Section 643.055.1 of the Missouri Statutes prohibits the Air Com-
mission from promulgating any standards or guidelines "stricter than
those required under the provisions of the federal Clean Air Act, as
amended." 06 Section 643.055.1, like the Florida statute,2 °7 lacks clear
language addressing the Air Commission's authority to regulate addi-
tional sources. The Missouri Court of Appeals' analysis in Missouri
Hospital Ass'n v. Air Conservation Commission208 results in an interpreta-
tion similar to the Florida District Court of Appeals' interpretation of
the Florida statute,"0 9 although with less precision. Recall that, in Mis-
souri Hospital Ass'n, the court ruled that if Congress had spoken on a
particular issue in the federal Clean Air Act, section 643.055.1 prohib-
its the Air Commission "from adopting rules or regulations on that
issue that are ... stricter than federal law."2 10 The court added, how-
ever, that the Air Commission "continues to have rulemaking author-
ity to regulate Missouri air quality in all ways, and in all areas, not
covered by the federal Clean Air Act."21
1
The court's recognition of the Air Commission's rule-making au-
thority in areas not effectively precluded by the Clean Air Act suggests
that the Air Commission may regulate sources not regulated in the
Clean Air Act. The court's statement that the Air Commission has no
authority to regulate when Congress has "spoken on a particular is-
sue,"2 12 however, somewhat confuses the matter, creating a problem-
atic ambiguity much like that created by the Florida Electric Power
opinion's "counterpoise" language.
Whether the Missouri statute constrains the Air Commission from
regulating additional sources depends on what the court meant by
saying that the Air Commission lacks authority when Congress has
spoken on a particular issue. Did the court mean that when Congress
has decided to regulate only certain categories of sources, it has spo-
ken on the regulation of additional sources, such that the Air Com-
mission no longer may regulate sources that Congress did not
regulate? Alternatively, did the court mean that inasmuch as Con-
gress has decided to regulate certain categories of sources, it only has
206. Mo. REv. STAT. § 643.055.1 (1993).
207. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.804 (West 1993).
208. 874 S.W.2d 380 (Mo. CL App. 1994).
209. See supra notes 120-130 and accompanying text.
210. Missouri Hosp. Ass'n, 874 S.W.2d at 396.
211. Id. at 397.
212. Id. at 396.
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spoken on the regulation of those specific sources such that the Air
Commission may regulate sources that Congress did not regulate? In
addition, it is unclear what the court meant by saying that the Air
Commission "continues to have rulemaking authority ... in all ways,
and in all areas, not covered by the federal Clean Air Act. 21 3
Although Missouri Hospital Ass'n does not address this issue as clearly
as Forida Electric Power, the Missouri court's focus on protecting the
regulated community from multiple sets of regulations2 1 4 suggests
that when Congress has left sources unregulated it has not "spoken
on" the issue, which would allow the Air Commission to regulate such
sources.
2 1 5
New Mexico presents the converse of the problem presented by
the Florida and Missouri statutes. Although section 74-2-5 of the New
Mexico Statutes contains language that appears to preclude the regu-
lation of sources not covered by the federal Clean Air Act, an opinion
by the New Mexico Attorney General muddies the issue somewhat.2 6
Section 74-2-5 provides that regulations "pertaining to visibility protec-
tion in mandatory class 1 areas, pertaining to prevention of significant
deterioration and pertaining to nonattainment areas," must be no
more stringent than the federal Clean Air Act requires, but also "shall
be applicable only to sources subject to such regulation pursuant to
the federal act."2 1 7 The statute further provides that performance
standards for sources, and emission standards for hazardous air pollu-
tants, must be no more stringent than required under the federal
Clean Air Act, but also "shall be applicable only to sources subject to
such federal standards of performance. "218 The language of the stat-
ute thus suggests that once EPA has established standards of perform-
ance for certain categories of sources, the New Mexico Air Quality
Control Board (NMAQCB) has authority to promulgate "standards of
performance" that address only those categories of sources.
213. Id.
214. See supra notes 73, 160, 171 and accompanying text.
215. The court's language is not particularly instructive, however, for it does not discuss
the circumstances in which the federal law does not encompass an entire category of
sources, such as the Clean Air Act's exemption from stack height regulations of sources in
existence before December 31, 1970. See 42 U.S.C. § 7423 (1988). Has Congress spoken to
the regulation of the exempted stacks in deciding to exempt them from federal regula-
tion? If so, then the state agency may not have the authority to regulate such stacks, as
such regulation would be more stringent than the Clean Air Act. If Congress has not
spoken to the regulation of such stacks, then the state agency perhaps does have the au-
thority to regulate such stacks.
216. 87 Op. N.M. Att'y Gen. 2 (1987); see supra notes 166-171 and accompanying text.
217. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-5C(1)(b) (Michie 1993).
218. Id. § 74-2-5C(2)(b).
1995] 1417
MARYLAND LAW REvIEW
The Attorney General's opinion states, however, that in those ar-
eas not specifically precluded by the New Mexico Air Quality Control
Act, the NMAQCB may "promulgate standards and regulations that
are more stringent than the federal standards and can promulgate
standards and regulations for which there is no equivalent federal
standard or regulation."219 To determine whether the NMAQCB can
regulate additional sources, one must determine the extent to which
section 74-2-5 specifically precludes regulation of such sources. A
plain meaning reading suggests that section 74-2-5 does specifically
preclude promulgation of regulations of additional sources in any of
the six categories set forth in the statute.22' This interpretation could
square with the Attorney General's opinion, because the six categories
the statute sets forth are not exhaustive. This allows an inference that
the statute does not specifically preclude the promulgation of other
types of regulations that may apply to additional sources. Nonethe-
less, the Attorney General's opinion robs section 74-2-5 of much of its
apparent initial clarity.
Other statutes are similarly susceptible to more than one inter-
pretation. A Colorado statute221 addressing indirect air pollution
sources prohibits regulations that are "more stringent than those re-
quired for compliance with the federal act and final rules and regula-
tions adopted pursuant thereto. "12 Ohio recently enacted a statute
for the purpose of implementing the Title V permit program under
the Clean Air Act which authorizes the adoption of rules "that are
consistent with, and no more stringent than, the requirements of Title
V of the federal Clean Air Act."223 The Arkansas statute regarding
water pollution control authorizes conditions in permits to achieve
effluent limitations by applying only such levels of treatment technol-
ogy and processes "as are required under the federal act or any more
stringent effluent limitations necessary to meet water quality criteria
or toxic standards established pursuant to any state or federal law or
regulation."2 2 4 The regulation of additional sources not covered by
the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act cannot, perhaps, be "required
for compliance with the federal act," or be part of "the requirements
219. 87 Op. N.M. Att'y Gen. at 2. Indeed, to bolster the point, the opinion specifically
referred to the existence of emission standards for pollutants that the federal Clean Air Act
did not specifically regulate. Id.
220. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-5.
221. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-7-114.2 (West Supp. 1994).
222. Id.
223. 1993 Ohio Laws File 62, § 1 (S.B. 153) (codified at OHIO Rxv. CODE ANN.
§ 3704.036 (Anderson 1994)).
224. Aim. CODE ANN. § 8-4-207(1)(A) (Michie 1991).
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of Title V," or be "required under the federal act"; therefore, the Col-
orado, .Ohio, and Arkansas statutes appear to prevent state agencies
from promulgating regulations applicable to additional sources not
covered by the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, respectively. How-
ever, because the Missouri Court of Appeals and the New Mexico At-
torney General failed to define the word "required" when interpreting
their respective state statutes, 22 5 the presence of the word "required"
or "requirement" in these three statutes may not constrain the state
agencies' authority to regulate additional sources.
Several state statutes concerning underground storage tanks are
analogous. These statutes not only fail to indicate state environmental
agencies' authority to impose additional regulations on federally regu-
lated sources, but also fail to indicate state agencies' authority to regu-
late additional sources. For example, Arizona's statute simply
provides that underground storage tank rules "shall be consistent with
and no more stringent than the federal regulations in effect on the
date on which the rules are adopted."2 2 6 This language offers no in-
sight into the state agency's authority to promulgate regulations appli-
cable to categories of underground storage tanks that federal law does
not address. This ambiguity is characteristic of comparable statutes in
other states. 7
225. See supra notes 153, 171 and accompanying text.
226. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-1003, -1006, -1009 (1993) (emphasis added).
227. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-35-10 (Supp. 1994) (providing that rules and regulations
pertaining to underground storage tanks shall "not be more stringent than those provided
by federal rules or regulations"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.474 (West Supp. 1994) (provid-
ing that rules adopted shall be "consistent with" and "shall not exceed" the requirements
of federal regulations once federal regulations are adopted); NEv. REv. STAT. § 459.824
(1991) (providing for administration of the provisions relating to storage tanks "in a man-
ner that is consistent with, and not more stringent than, the applicable provisions of fed-
eral law"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 249:17 (1993) (providing that rules relating to financial
responsibility for underground storage tanks adopted pursuant to § 149-C:9 "shall not be
more stringent than the federal rules"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-20.3-04.1 (1991) (providing
that regulations relating to underground storage tanks "may not be more stringent than
applicable federal rules" adopted pursuant to RCRA); OKIA STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 307 (West
Supp. 1995) (requiring that for any standard different from a federal standard on the same
subject the agency shall "clearly express the deviation from the federal standard ... and
the reasons for the deviation"); OR. RExv. STAT. § 466.746 (1991) (providing that perform-
ance standards shall be consistent with federal standards and that soil assessment and tank
tighmess requirements "shall not be more stringent" than federal requirements, absent a
finding that more stringent standards are necessary); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.357
(West 1991) (providing that standards and rules "may not [be] ... more stringent than the
federal requirements" unless there is a determination that more stringent standards are
necessary); W. VA. CODE § 22-17-6 (1994) (providing that rules relating to underground
storage tanks "shall be no more stringent than the rules" EPA promulgates pursuant to
subtitle I); Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-1416 (1994) (providing that rules and regulations shall
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C. Impact on Source-Specfic Regulations Related to Compliance with
Ambient Standards
State statutes governing state implementation of the Clean Air
Act and Clean Water Act present an additional interpretive problem.
This problem results from the duality of these regulatory systems,
which contain both ambient standards and source-specific stan-
dards.22 State agencies are in something of a catch-22, inasmuch as
they must assure compliance with the requirements of the federal Acts
while under constraint not to promulgate standards more stringent
than federal law. In order to assure compliance with ambient stan-
dards under the Clean Air Act, for example, a state environmental
agency almost certainly must impose standards more stringent than
specifically required by the Clean Air Act because the Act's source-
specific standards in themselves are generally insufficient to assure
compliance with the ambient standards. 2 9 Nonetheless, many state
statutes fail to recognize a state agency's possible need for authority to
promulgate more stringent source-specific standards to assure compli-
ance with federal ambient standards. Moreover, even when a state
statute gives a state environmental agency such authority, the statute
frequently fails to define the authority's scope.230
1. The Authority to Impose More Stringent Source-Specific Standards.-
In response to congressional direction under the Clean Air Act, EPA
has established national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for
several pollutants.231 Congress made the states responsible for devel-
oping plans to assure compliance with the NAAQS. 32 A hypothetical
illustrates the consequences of this delegation. Assume that a given
state's legislature passes a statute directing the state environmental
agency to promulgate rules to assure compliance with the Clean Air
Act, provided that the rules are no more stringent than that Act. As-
sume further that one or more air quality control regions within the
state are not in compliance with the ambient standard for one or
"[p]rovide for performance, operating and installation standards for underground storage
tanks which shall be no less or no more stringent than the federal standards").
228. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
229. This problem arises because the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act do not contain
source-specific standards for the entire universe of sources of pollution.
230. For instance, it is often unclear whether a state environmental agency can impose
more stringent source-specific standards to create a sufficient margin of safety to assure
that the state will continue to comply with the ambient standard as new sources of emis-
sions start operation.
231. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
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more of the criteria pollutants for which EPA has established NAAQS.
Finally, assume that the state environmental agency proposes regula-
tions designed to ensure compliance with the Clean Air Act by impos-
ing on sources covered by the Clear Air Act, emission standards more
stringent than the Act requires. In such a scenario, would the state
environmental agency be acting beyond its authority by attempting to
impose a standard more stringent than federal law?
To answer this question, we need to answer the following ques-
tions: When state legislation prohibits a state environmental agency
from promulgating standards more stringent than federal environ-
mental law, what does the state legislature mean? Is it agreeing with
federal decisions regarding both ambient standards and source-spe-
cific standards, such that the state agency must assure compliance with
the ambient standards by regulating additional sources because it
lacks authority to impose more stringent source-specific standards on
sources regulated under the Clean Air Act? Alternatively, is the state
legislature primarily agreeing with the federal legislative decision re-
garding ambient standards, and only secondarily agreeing with the
federal decision regarding source-specific regulation, such that the
state environmental agency may assure compliance with the ambient
standards by imposing more stringent source-specific standards on
sources regulated under the Clean Air Act, to the extent such strin-
gency is necessary to assure compliance with the ambient standards?
a. Statutes That Clearly Allow More Stringent Source-Specific Reg-
ulations When Necessary to Assure Compliance with Ambient Standards.-
Several state statutes provide a clear answer to this dilemma with ex-
press statutory language authorizing the state agency to promulgate
regulations more stringent than federal regulations to the extent nec-
essary to assure compliance with ambient standards. For instance, the
Missouri General Assembly recently amended section 643.055.1 of the
Missouri statutes to provide that its restrictions "shall not apply to the
parts of a state implementation plan developed by the commission to
bring a nonattainment area into compliance and to maintain compli-
ance when needed to have a[n EPA] approved state implementation
plan.""' 3 Rhode Island's statute relating to the regulation of emis-
sions from fuels likewise allows state agencies to promulgate regula-
tions more stringent than the mandatory standards established by
federal law, to the extent that such more stringent standards "are
needed for the attainment or maintenance of air quality standards."2"4
233. 1994 Mo. Laws 590.
234. RI. GEN. LAws § 23-23-5(12) (Supp. 1994).
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Two other states include similar language in their statutes con-
trolling water quality. The Arkansas statute2 35 regarding water pollu-
tion control requires that permits issued achieve effluent limitations
required under the federal act, "or any more stringent effluent limita-
tions necessary to meet water quality criteria or toxic standards estab-
lished pursuant to any state or federal law or regulation."2 3 6 Iowa's
statute237 concerning water quality standards, pretreatment standards
and effluent standards, provides that if EPA "has promulgated an ef-
fluent standard or pretreatment standard pursuant to sections 201,
306 or 307 of the federal Water Pollution Control Act, a pretreatment
or effluent standard adopted pursuant to this section shall not be
more stringent than the federal effluent or pretreatment standard for
such source."238 This statute, however, specifically does "not preclude
the establishment of a more restrictive effluent limitation in the per-
mit for a particular point source if the more restrictive effluent limita-
tion is necessary to meet water quality standards."23 9
b. Statutes That Lack Any Language Regarding the State Agency's
Authority to Impose More Stringent Source-Specific Regulations When Neces-
sary to Assure Compliance with Ambient Standards.--Several states have
statutes that constrain the state agency's authority to impose regula-
tions more stringent than the Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act, but
contain no language reconciling the tension between a state agency's
responsibility to achieve compliance with federal ambient standards
and its inability to impose source-specific standards more stringent
than federal requirements. 2 ° An Attorney General's opinion inter-
preting a recently revised West Virginia statute24 1 perhaps most clearly
235. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-207(1)(A) (Michie 1991).
236. Id.
237. IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B. 173.2 (West Supp. 1994).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-7-114.2 (West Supp. 1994) (regulating indirect
air pollution sources); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-8-202(8)(a) (West 1990) (enumerating
duties of water quality control commission); FLA_ STAT. ANN. § 403.804 (West 1993)
(enumerating powers and duties of state environmental regulation commission); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13A.120(1) (Baldwin 1988) (addressing adoption of administrative regula-
tions); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-5 (Michie 1993) (governing air pollution standards); N.D.
CENT. CoDE § 23-01-04.1.1 (1991) (limiting state agency's rule-making authority); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-40-4.1 (1992) (limiting stringency of rules that state environmental
agency may promulgate); UTAH CoDE ANN. §§ 19-2-106, -5-105 (1991) (addressing author-
ity to administer Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:1
(Michie 1992) (forbidding state agency to promulgate standards more stringent than re-
quired under the Clean Water Act).
241. W. VA. CODE § 16-20-5(4) (1993), repeakd by 1994 W. Va. Acts 61, replaced ly W. VA.
CODE § 22-5-4(4) (1994); see supra note 174.
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illustrates the tensions that arise in interpreting a statute that con-
strains a state agency's authority to promulgate standards more strin-
gent than federal law when the federal law imposes both ambient and
source-specific standards.242
Section .16-20-5(4) of the West Virginia Code provided the APC
Commission with the authority to adopt and promulgate reasonable
rules and regulations relating to air pollution, provided "that no rule
or program of the [Commission] shall be any more stringent than any
federal rule or program," absent a specific written finding regarding
the need for the more stringent standard.243 The statutory language
offered nothing to resolve the tension between ambient standards and
source-specific standards.
In 1979, however, the Director of the APC Commission requested
an opinion from the West Virginia Attorney General on the extent to
which two aspects of a regulation of particulate emissions complied
with section 16-20-5(4).2" The West Virginia Attorney General's
opinion clearly acknowledged the tension that exists, in the absence
of clear legislative direction, between a state agency's obligation to
assure compliance with ambient standards and its inability to impose
source-specific standards more stringent than federal regulations.
The Attorney General's opinion also proposed a resolution of the
problem that could serve as a guide for other states.24 5
242. 58 Op. W. Va. Att'y Gen. 127 (1979). The reader should note that any subse-
quently referenced citations in the Attorney General's opinion may refer to statutes and
regulations that have been amended, revised, or repealed since the opinion's issuance in
1979.
243. W. VA. CODE § 16-20-5(4).
244. 58 Op. W. Va. Att'y Gen. 127 (1979).
245. Id. The Commission promulgated regulations partly because portions of West Vir-
ginia failed to attain ambient standards for particulate matter. The Attorney General's
opinion relied on an earlier version of § 16-20-5(4) that read, in pertinent part: "[N]o
rule, regulation, standard, program or plan of the commission to control air pollution
from any source hereafter promulgated, adopted or implemented, may be more stringent
than any federal rule, regulation, standard, program or plan applicable to the control of
air pollution from that source." Id. at 128.
From this language, the Attorney General drew several conclusions. First, the section
applied only to "rules, regulations, standards, programs or plans of the [APC] Commission
to control air pollution which apply to sources." Id. at 131. The Attorney General reached
this conclusion by reasoning that any other interpretation of the statute would render the
phrases "from any source" and "from that source" meaningless. Id. Next, the Attorney
General concluded the statute applied only "when the federal government has a rule, regu-
lation, program, plan or standard for the same sources which the [APC] Commission will
regulate." Id. In addition, the Attorney General concluded that "[flederal rules, regula-
tions, programs, plans and standards for sources include: new source performance stan-
dards, national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants, prevention of significant
deterioration permits and mobile source emission limitations." Id. at 132-33. Finally, the
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The Attorney General's opinion initially focused on whether the
regulation, which addressed prevention and control of particulate air
emissions, violated section 16-20-5(4) in that it required "a facility lo-
cated in an attainment area.., which may impact on a nonattainment
area . . . to meet the same emission limitations as in the nonattain-
ment area."2 46 The' Attorney General's opinion started from the
premise that the state has an obligation to develop a State Implemen-
tation Plan to assure attainment of ambient air standards.2 4 7 The
opinion further noted that, in the context of developing a State Im-
plementation Plan, the designation of a source's location as attain-
ment or nonattainment does not determine, in itself, the emissions
limitations applicable to that source. This is so because the mobility
of air pollution ensures that sources that contribute to the violation of
ambient standards may be far from the emitting site.2 48 Because the
state must assure attainment of the ambient air standards, and be-
cause sources outside a nonattainment area may affect that area, the
Attorney General's opinion concluded that the APC Commission did
not violate section 16-20-5(4) by requiring that a facility in an attain-
ment area comply with the standards for equivalent facilities in a
nonattainment area.249
Next, the Attorney General's opinion focused on whether the
regulation's ten percent opacity requirement violated section 16-20-
5(4) .250 The opinion concluded that section 16-20-5(4) did not affect
the APC Commission's authority to apply the ten percent opacity re-
quirement to existing sources, because EPA did not set emission limi-
tations for those sources. 251 The opinion then examined the
narrower issue of whether section 16-20-5(4) precluded the APC Com-
mission from applying the ten percent opacity standard to new
sources for which federal regulations do exist.252 The opinion noted
Attorney General concluded that the statute applied only "to rules, regulations, programs,
standards or plans put into effect after enactment of the [statute]." Id. at 134.
246. Id. at 137. Four areas within West Virginia had been designated nonattainment for
total suspended particulates. Id.
247. Id. at 137-38 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (A)).
248. Id. at 138-39.
249. Id. at 139.
250. Id. Section 4.01 of the regulation provided that "No person shall cause, suffer,
allow, or permit the discharge of particulate matter from any materials handling and/or
preparation activity in excess of ten (10%) percent opacity averaged over a six (6) minute
period." Id.
251. Id. One of the preliminary conclusions the Attorney General reached was that
§ 16-20-5(4) applied only when a federal rule, regulation, program, or plan existed for the
source which the APC Commission was to regulate. See supra note 245.
252. 58 Op. W. Va. Att'y Gen. at 139.
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that EPA had promulgated new source performance standards con-
taining opacity limits of ten percent, twenty percent, and twenty per-
cent, respectively, for emissions of "particulate matter from material
handling and/or preparation activities of Portland Cement Plants,
asphalt concrete plants and coal preparation plants."2 53 The Attorney
General then concluded that "it appears that the [APC] Commission
cannot regulate new asphalt concrete plants and coal preparation
plants more stringently than twenty percent opacity for particulate
matter. 
254
The Attorney General's opinion also noted, however, that this
conclusion raised an interpretive question: When a federal regulation
under the Clean Air Act prescribes a specific standard for sources that
a state regulation also covers, and the Clean Air Act requires attain-
ment with ambient air quality standards, which federal requirement
controls for the purposes of section 16-20-5(4)?255 To resolve this di-
lemma, the opinion employed a fundamental rule of statutory con-
struction, namely that a statute's overall purpose controls its separate
provisions.2 56 Because section 16-20-1 of the West Virginia Code pro-
vided that it was the state's public policy to assure air quality in com-
pliance with the Clean Air Act by attaining and maintaining ambient
air quality standards, the opinion resolved any ambiguity in favor of
the federal statute requiring attainment of ambient standards, and
against the federal regulation prescribing a new source performance
standard.257 Accordingly, the opinion concluded that the APC Com-
mission's application of the ten percent opacity standard to new
sources did not violate section 16-20-5(4) because it aimed to assure
compliance with the ambient air standard. 5 8
Thus, even though section 16-20-5(4) contained no specific lan-
guage resolving the tension between ambient standards and source-
specific standards, under the Attorney General's interpretation of sec-
tion 16-20-5(4), the APC Commission had the authority both to im-
pose regulations on sources ignored by the Clean Air Act, and to
impose more stringent standards than the Act requires on sources reg-
ulated by the Clean Air Act. The state agency could exercise both of
253. Id. at 139-40 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.62(c), 60.92(a) (2), 60.252(c)).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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these powers to the extent necessary to fulfill the state's obligation to
assure compliance with the NAAQS.2 11
The reasoning in the West Virginia Attorney General's opinion
interpreting section 16-20-5(4) offers guidance to other states in
which statutory constraints on state agency authority create tension
between the need to assure compliance with ambient standards and
the obligation to promulgate source-specific standards no more strin-
gent than federal law. As well-reasoned as the opinion is, however, it
offers incomplete guidance because it falls to acknowledge and dis-
cuss an alternative construction of the state agency's statutory author-
ity. West Virginia's statute generally precluded more stringent state
regulations of federally regulated sources, but allowed regulations of
sources not addressed by federal law. Therefore, the Attorney Gen-
eral just as easily could have interpreted the statute to limit the state
agency's authority to regulating federally unregulated sources when
seeking compliance with ambient standards.26
2. Extent of Authority to Impose More Stringent Standards.-A fur-
ther hypothetical may shed light on the issue of an agency's authority
to impose standards more stringent than federal law requires. Assume
that a given state's legislature passes a statute directing the state envi-
ronmental agency to promulgate rules to assure compliance with the
Clean Air Act, provided that the rules are no more stringent than that
Act, except when necessary to assure compliance with the NAAQS.
Assume further that one or more air quality control regions within the
state are not in compliance with the NAAQS for one or more of the
criteria pollutants for which EPA has established NAAQS. Next, as-
sume that the state environmental agency proposes regulations
designed to assure compliance with the Clean Air Act by creating a
margin of safety between the ambient levels of a given pollutant and
the NAAQS for such pollutant. Finally, assume that the proposed reg-
ulations impose on sources covered under the Clean Air Act emission
standards more stringent than required under that Act. Under these
circumstances, would the state environmental agency be acting be-
259. See id. at 143-44.
260. Interestingly, when the West Virginia Legislature recently repealed § 16-20-5(4)
and replaced it with § 22-5-4(4), it failed to address completely the ambiguities discussed in
the Attorney General's opinion. Although § 22-1-31 makes it clear that a regulation appli-
cable to sources not regulated under federal law is not "more stringent" than federal law,
neither § 2 2-1-3a nor § 22-5-4(4) addresses the director's authority to impose on sources
regulated under federal law standards more stringent than federal law when necessary to
assure compliance with ambient standards.
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yond its authority by attempting to impose a standard more stringent
than required under federal law?
To answer this question, we need to answer the following ques-
tions: When state legislation prohibits a state environmental agency
from promulgating environmental standards more stringent than fed-
eral law, except to the extent necessary to comply with NAAQS, what
does the state legislature mean? Is it giving the state agency the au-
thority to impose more stringent standards only to the extent needed
just to meet, but not exceed, the ambient standard? Alternatively, is
the state legislature giving the state agency the authority to impose
more stringent standards to the extent needed to create a margin of
safety to assure continued compliance with the ambient standard in
the dynamic environment affecting ambient air quality?
a. The Nature of the Problem: Public Service Co. v. New Mex-
ico Environmental Improvement Board.-A New Mexico case
presents perhaps the clearest discussion of this problem. Even before
the New Mexico Legislature added the language in section 74-2-
5(c) (1)-(2) of the New Mexico Statutes constraining the New Mexico
Air Quality Control Board from enacting regulations more stringent
than required under federal law, 61 litigation had arisen concerning
the scope of the Environmental Improvement Board's (Board) au-
thority to enact regulations more stringent than federal law. In Public
Service Co. v. New Mexico Environmental Improvement Board,62 several
utilities challenged the Board's amendment of a regulation of sulfur
dioxide emissions, asserting that the Board's amendment was not in
accordance with the law.26 In issuing its regulation, the Board ex-
pressly noted that it was limiting sulfur dioxide emissions more than
the Clean Air Act requires because by "reducing the amount of sulfur
dioxide permitted in the air from existing sources, more room will be
made available, up to the state sulfur dioxide standard, for new indus-
try in the Four Comers area."2 " The Board further noted that the
regulations were necessary "[i] n order for New Mexico to regain con-
trol over its air in the Four Comers region."265 The utilities con-
tended that section 12-14-5(A), which provided, "[t]he board shall
prevent or abate air pollution,"26 strictly limited the Board's author-
ity. The challenged amendment, according to the utilities, was be-
261. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-5(c)(1)-(2) (Michie 1993).
262. 549 P.2d 638 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976).
263. Id. at 640-41.
264. Id. at 641.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 640.
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yond the Board's authority because it was not necessary "to prevent or
abate air pollution."267
The first premise of the New Mexico Court of Appeals's decision
was that "[a]dministrative bodies are the creatures of statutes . . .
[that] can act only as to those matters which are within the scope of
the authority delegated to them."2 6 The court found that the Board's
legislative mandate was "expressed in simple and direct language:
The board shall prevent or abate air pollution."269 The court noted
that in adopting the ambient air standard for sulfur dioxide, the
Board established the criterion "for determining what concentration
of this particular air contaminant, in a specific time frame, constituted
air pollution."270 With this limitation in mind, the court ruled that
the Board had no authority to promulgate standards for the emission
of sulfur dioxide that anticipated future industrial development in the
area.271 The court further concluded that the Board had no authority
to promulgate regulations more stringent than required by federal
law in order for New Mexico to regain control over its air.2 72 The
court found that "[t] here is no evidence in this record of any present
need, or a reasonably anticipated future need, to warrant the adop-
tion of [the regulation] to prevent or abate a violation of the ambient
air quality standard" for sulfur dioxide.275
Judge Lopez dissented, viewing the fundamental dispute as one
concerning "the manner in which emission regulations are fixed."
2 74
According to Judge Lopez, the utilities contended that once the
Board set the ambient air standard for sulfur dioxide, the "emission
regulations [for existing sources] must be set at such a level that the
New Mexico standard will be just met, but not exceeded."2 75 Phrased
differently, Judge Lopez interpreted the utilities' argument, and the
majority's holding, as follows: (1) the Board has authority only to pre-
vent or abate "air pollution"; (2) "air pollution" exists when ambient
air standards are exceeded; (3) therefore, the Board has no authority
to regulate emissions to reduce ambient air concentrations below the
ambient standards. 276 Further, Judge Lopez interpreted the Board's
267. Id. at 642.
268. Id. at 641 (citing Maxwell Land Grant Co. v. Jones, 213 P. 1034 (N.M. 1923)).
269. Id. at 641-42.
270. Id. at 642.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 644.
274. Id. at 646 (Lopez,J., dissenting).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 647.
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argument to be that the ambient standard does not directly dictate
the appropriate emissions limitations for existing sources because in
setting emissions limitations, the Board must examine different fac-
tors than it must when setting ambient standards.
277
Accordingly, Judge Lopez suggested that the first issue to resolve
in deciding the case must be whether the Board had the authority to
"set emission regulations at a level lower than that necessary to meet
the [ambient air] standard."2 7 1 If the Board had such authority, then
the second issue must involve an interpretation of the statutory frame-
work within which the Board may set lower emission levels; only by
resolving this second issue can one determine whether the Board ac-
ted within its delegated discretion. 279 After studying the statute, Judge
Lopez concluded that the Board "is not compelled to set the emis-
sions regulations at such a level as to meet the [ambient air] stan-
dard," and that the regulations were well within the Board's mandate
to consider the "public interest."211 Specifically, Judge Lopez stated:
The "public interest" is a broad enough concept to permit
the Board to weigh how the public will best be served: by
permitting the first plants in the area to "use up" the clean
air, or by weighing the hardship to these appellants against
the "social and economic value" of the new industries which
the area expects to attract.281
Subsequently, the Board asked the New Mexico Attorney General
to give his opinion on whether the Board could "adopt emission regu-
lations for existing stationary sources which would take into considera-
tion air contaminant emissions for reasonably anticipated future
growth in the area."2 82  Noting that the court in Public Service Co. nar-
277. Id. at 646.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 647-48.
281. Id. at 648. Judge Lopez clearly understood that the case presented a question of
resource allocation pitting the existing utilities' interests against the interests of potential
new sources.
The United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427
U.S. 246 (1976), in the same year as the decision in Public Service Go., and reached a deci-
sion consistent with Judge Lopez's dissent. In Union Electric, the Court specifically recog-
nized that § 116 of the Clean Air Act gives states the freedom to develop a State
Implementation Plan (SIP) that would result in air quality better than the NAAQS mini-
mum. The Court rejected the argument that the Clean Air Act precludes EPA from ap-
proving SIPs that are more stringent than necessary to assure compliance with the national
ambient air standards by the statutory deadlines. Id. at 260-66.
282. 77 Op. N.M. Att'y Gen. 118 (1977).
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rowly construed the Board's authority, the Attorney General's opinion
described the court's reasoning as follows:
1) the board had the authority to prevent or abate air
pollution;
2) air pollution was defined by the applicable ambient air
standard;
3) regulations explaining or implementing such standard
must be for the purpose of preventing or abating emissions
which would result in the standard being exceeded; and
4) there was no evidence in the record of present or reason-
ably anticipated future need for a new regulation to prevent
violation of the standard. 83
According to the Attorney General, the court held that "although the
board does not have the authority to plan generally for the industrial
development of the state, "28 the Board may adopt new emission regu-
lations for both existing and proposed sources "if there is substantial
evidence in the record of a present or reasonably anticipated future
need for a stricter regulation in order to prevent air pollution in ex-
cess of the standard."285
Subsequently, in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. New Mexico Environmen-
tal Improvement Board,286 Kennecott, relying on the decision in Public
Service Co., contested the Board's revised sulfur dioxide emission stan-
dard for copper smelters, claiming that the Board exceeded its au-
thority under the state air quality statute.287 The court noted that
"[w] hen New Mexico standards are amended and thus made more
stringent in order to comply with federal requirements, the Board is
doing no more than it is obliged to do" under the Clean Air Act.288 At
the same time, the court observed, the Board is fulfilling its duty
under section 74-2-5 of the New Mexico Statutes to "prevent or abate
air pollution."289 The court specifically distinguished the Public Service
Co. decision, noting that in that case the Board had adopted regula-
283. Id. at 120.
284. Id.
285. Id. Although the Attorney General's opinion recognized that the court did not
provide a bright line test with respect to circumstances that would constitute sufficient
"evidence of reasonably anticipated future need," the opinion suggested that "[t]he board
may act 'to prevent or abate air pollution' when presented with persuasive evidence that
emission sources are growing in number and that the totality of new and existing emissions
will, if left at presently regulated rates, exceed the Ambient Air Quality Standard." Id. at
120-21.
286. 614 P.2d 22 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
287. Id. at 24.
288. Id. at 25.
289. Id.
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dons requiring performance far beyond that necessary to meet its own
standard, whereas in the case under consideration the Board had
adopted regulations requiring only that level of performance neces-
sary to attain the standard. 9 °
Notably, in spite of this history of litigation, when the New Mex-
ico Legislature enacted section 74-2-5 it failed to address the issue of
the extent of the state agency's authority to assure compliance with
ambient standards by providing a margin of safety. Rather, the legisla-
ture simply provided that the NMAQCB had the authority to impose
more stringent source-specific standards than required by federal law
only when necessary "to achieve national ambient air quality standards
in nonattainment areas. "291
b. States with Some Language Addressing the Extent of Authority to
Impose More Stringent Source-Specific Standards to Assure a Margin of Safety
for Ambient Standards.-In addition to New Mexico, four states have
statutes containing language giving the state agency authority to im-
pose more stringent source-specific standards to assure compliance
with ambient standards. Two of these states have statutes whose lan-
guage appears to address the issue presented in Public Service Co.
For example, the Missouri legislature recently amended its statute
to provide that "[t]he restrictions of [section 643.055.1] shall not ap-
ply to the parts of a state implementation plan developed by the com-
mission to bring a nonattainment area into compliance and to maintain
compliance when needed to have a[n] ... approved state implementa-
tion plan."2 92 Rhode Island's statute similarly provides that regula-
tions governing fuel emission characteristics "shall not be more
stringent than the mandatory standards established under federal law
or regulation, unless it can be shown that such [regulations] . . .are
needed for the attainment or maintenance of air quality standards.""9 Be-
cause both of these statutes provide authority both to attain and to
maintain compliance with ambient standards, both appear to give
290. Id. Judge Andrews dissented, believing that the regulation was not in accordance
with § 74-2-5 because the Board failed to consider economic concerns and because the
regulation obligated Kennecott to employ a specific method of control. Id. at 26 (An-
drews, J., dissenting).
291. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-5 (Michie 1993). By granting the state agency authority to
impose standards to achieve national ambient air quality standards in nonattainment areas,
the New Mexico statute arguably affirms Public Service Co., which held that the Board only
can impose standards to achieve, but not to go beyond, the ambient air standards.
292. 1994 Mo. Laws 590 (emphasis added).
293. R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-23-5(12) (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
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their state agencies the authority to require more stringent source-
specific standards to provide a margin of safety.
The statutes of the other two states, however, share the problem
evident in the New Mexico statute. The Arkansas 294 and Iowa 295 stat-
utes contain clear language authorizing the state agency to impose
more stringent source-specific standards than the Clean Water Act, to
the extent necessary to assure compliance with the Act's water quality
standards. The Arkansas and Iowa statutes, however, never clarify
whether the state agencies have authority to assure that a margin of
safety exists to ensure continued maintenance of the water quality
standards, or authority only to assure that the water quality standards
are merely achieved. 96
IV. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED MODEL LEGISLATION
This Article has analyzed the extent to which state legislative con-
straints on the authority of state environmental agencies demonstrate
the state legislature's agreement with the resolution or apparent reso-
lution of issues under federal law. The Article highlights that a statute
providing that a state agency "may not promulgate rules more strin-
gent than federal law" creates a problematic ambiguity and offers the
affected agency, the regulated community, concerned citizens and the
courts little insight into the actual extent of the state agency's
authority.
The Article suggests that state legislatures that have enacted such
simplistically drafted statutory constraints on state agency authority
have overlooked significant problems arising from the intersection of
such spare language and the complexity of federal environmental law.
Accepting that such statutory constraints, at a minimum, demonstrate
a state legislature's agreement with the federal government's decision
to regulate certain sources in a certain manner, this Article posits that
these state statutory constraints nonetheless raise three issues regard-
ing how much a state legislature agrees with the federal government's
decision to refrain from regulating sources. The first question is, what
is the state agency's authority to impose additional regulations on reg-
294. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-207(1) (A) (Michie 1989) (providing for more stringent efflu-
ent limitations if "necessary to meet water quality criteria or toxic standards established
pursuant to any state or federal law or regulation").
295. IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.173.2 (West 1993) (allowing for more stringent effluent
limitations "if the more restrictive effluent limitation is necessary to meet water quality
standards").
296. AR.& CODE ANN. § 8-4-207(1)(A) (Michie 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.173.2
(West Supp. 1994).
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ulated sources? 297 The second question is, what is the agency's au-
thority to impose regulations on additional sources?298 The third
question is, how should one interpret these statutory constraints with
respect to the agency's authority to impose more stringent source-spe-
cific standards when necessary to assure compliance with ambient
standards?2 9
With respect to the first and second questions, state legislatures
quite simply need to be more specific. They could provide a great
deal of guidance to state agencies, the regulated community, con-
cerned citizens, and the courts by adding a few words detailing the
state agency's authority to promulgate regulations for additional pol-
lutants or additional sources.
For example, if a state legislature wishes to authorize a state
agency to administer the federal air program, but also wishes to pre-
clude the state agency from regulating additional pollutants and addi-
tional sources not within the Clean Air Act, it could use the following
language:
To assure that state regulations are not more stringent than
federal law: (1) the state agency may not regulate sources
not regulated under federal law; and (2) when a state agency
promulgates regulations applicable to a source regulated
under federal law, the state regulations applicable to such
source may not include pollutants or obligations not regu-
lated or imposed under federal law with respect to such
source.
300
This language clearly limits the state agency's authority to the scope of
federal regulations. It permits no extension to additional pollutants
or additional sources, and also precludes imposing additional obliga-
tions, such as testing or reporting.301
The third question, namely the tension between a state agency's
obligation to assure compliance with ambient standards under the
297. See supra Part IIIA
298. See supra Part III.B.
299. See supra Part III.C.
300. Other formulations of statutory language likely would be effective as well, including
some of the language discussed earlier in the Article. See, e.g., supra notes 104-105 and
accompanying text (discussing 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4006.6(a) (1993) which incorpo-
rates by reference federal regulations of pollutants under the Clean Air Act), and supra
notes 191-194 and accompanying text (discussing the language of § 23-01-04.1.1 of the
North Dakota Code providing that "[t]he state agency may not adopt rules ... for which
there are no corresponding federal regulations.").
301. One could modify this language to make the constraint conditional, see generaly
supra Part I.B.
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Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act and its statutory inability to impose
source-specific standards more stringent than federal law is more com-
plex. This unfortunate complexity would diminish considerably, how-
ever, if state legislatures included language like the following in their
statutes limiting the authority of state environmental agencies:
The state agency shall not impose standards more stringent
than the standards of federal law, except to the extent that
more stringent regulations are needed to assure that the
state attains compliance with, and will be able to continue to
maintain compliance with, national ambient air quality stan-
dards (or water quality standards) .302
This language clarifies that the state agency not only may promulgate
more stringent source-specific standards to assure that the state meets
the ambient standards, but also may promulgate standards that create
a margin of safety allowing further growth without constant reevalua-
tion of source-specific standards to assure continued compliance with
ambient standards.80 3
Regardless of whether one believes in the wisdom of such statu-
tory constraints on state agency authority, the trend of the law sug-
gests that .state legislatures will continue to enact them. The
preceding suggestions offer no panacea, for they likely would not re-
solve all disputes over the interpretation of such statutory constraints.
This is especially true given the increasing complexity of federal envi-
ronmental law. Nonetheless, the suggested statutory language could
minimize disputes over the interpretation of statutory constraints on
state agency authority by more clearly indicating to all interested par-
ties how much the state legislature agrees and disagrees with federal
decisions on the scope of environmental regulation.
302. See. supra notes 292-293 (discussing language in 1994 Mo. Laws 590 and R.I. GEN.
LAws § 23-23-5(12) (Supp. 1994)). Of course, this language could be modified to apply to
water quality standards under the Clean Water Act.
303. One could modify this language to make the constraint conditional, see generaly
supra notes 33-36.
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